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I. INTRODUCTION
The American intelligence infrastructure is in the midst of its most radical
overhaul since the formation of the modem intelligence community following
World War II. The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004,1
the political compromise resulting from the nation's post-September 11
intelligence soul searching, has fundamentally transformed the U.S.
intelligence bureaucracy. Yet the policy debate to date has paid insufficient
attention to whether the fifty-eight-year-old mandate of the Central Intelligence
Agency (CIA) requires amendment in light of the contemporary fight against
terrorism.
A primary impetus for reform of the U.S. intelligence infrastructure was the
breakdown of critical distinctions upon which the division of labor among
national security agencies is based. The current national security context and
the war on terrorism have blurred the line between intelligence and law
enforcement, and it has become hackneyed to note that terrorist plots do not
observe the foreign and domestic divisions that exist in the jurisdictional duties
of U.S. agencies. Still an important area of analysis has so far escaped any
serious public debate or legislative attention: Do the limits of CIA authority
outlined in the National Security Act of 19472 meet the needs of the modem
national security environment?
Policymakers should revisit the CIA's statutory mandate in light of the
current struggle against terrorism in order to clarify the limits of CIA authority.
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The CIA charter contains categorical yet undefined prohibitions against
"police, subpoena, or law enforcement powers or internal security functions." 3
Ambiguity as to the boundaries of these proscriptions presents a double-edged
sword. If left unchecked, the exigencies of the fight against terrorism may draw
the CIA into prohibited law enforcement activities at the price of missed
criminal convictions and violations of civil liberties. At the same time, vague
limits of CIA authority may unnecessarily impede more effective cooperation
with law enforcement agencies to counter terrorism and other transboundary
national security threats. Statutory clarification of the CIA mandate provides
the best hope of improving efficiency while preventing abuses and represents
an important ingredient in the recipe for successful intelligence reform in the
long run.
This Note's analysis is divided into three parts.4 Part II examines the
genesis and meaning of the CIA mandate as defined in the National Security
Act of 1947, as well as how the ambiguity in that mandate has facilitated
abuses in the past. Part III explains how the current national security context
challenges many of the jurisdictional and conceptual distinctions upon which
the National Security Act is based. Finally, Part IV outlines the risks inherent in
maintaining the ambiguity in the status quo, examines alternative solutions, and
proposes specific statutory revisions to clarify the CIA charter.
II. THE ORIGINS AND FUNCTIONING OF THE CIA MANDATE
General Dwight Eisenhower described the U.S. intelligence apparatus
before World War II as "a shocking deficiency that impeded all constructive
planning." 5 It was clear at the war's conclusion that the United States needed to
fundamentally overhaul its intelligence infrastructure. The attempt to do so
became intertwined with broader initiatives to redesign the bureaucratic
architecture of foreign policymaking and to combine the disparate military
branches into a single department. These efforts culminated in a landmark piece
of legislation: the National Security Act of 1947, which created the CIA and
defined its mandate.
6
3. IRTPA § 1011 (to be codified at 50 U.S.C. § 403-4a(d)(l)).
4. The methodology of this Note is partially dictated by the sensitive nature of the subject matter.
The availability of "open source" information on specific CIA activities is limited, and oftentimes
internal regulations or other materials pertinent to the topic at hand are classified. This Note therefore
supplements the limited availability of relevant unclassified literature with interviews of current and
former practitioners in the field of intelligence law from the Office of the Inspector General and the
Office of the General Counsel at the Central Intelligence Agency, the Office of the General Counsel at
the National Security Agency, the U.S. Senate Subcommittee on Terrorism, Technology & Homeland
Security, and the Office of Intelligence Policy and Review and Office of Legal Counsel at the
Department of Justice. These interviews were conducted with both current and former intelligence
officials with diverse professional experiences in the intelligence community in order to receive as broad
a set of views as possible.
5. DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER, CRUSADE IN EUROPE 32 (1948).
6. Additionally, the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 created and clarified procurement
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A. The National Security Act of 1947
The creation and design of the Central Intelligence Agency were inspired
by lessons of World War II and by the national security environment of the late
1940s. The CIA was thus born from the collective memory of the surprise
attack on Pearl Harbor, the realization that the national intelligence capacity
needed improvement, and a growing fear of communism.7 "With horrible
images of World War II fresh in people's minds, the Gestapo metaphor...
encouraged the president and Congress to preclude the possibility of an
intelligence monopoly."' To that end, Congress sought to delineate clear
jurisdictional roles: The CIA would focus exclusively on foreign intelligence
matters while the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) would retain its status
as the premier federal domestic law enforcement agency.
9
The National Security Act originally created the position of Director of
Central Intelligence (DCI) to serve three roles as: (1) the president's principal
advisor on intelligence matters; (2) the nominal head of the intelligence
community; and (3) the head of the Central Intelligence Agency. As the
nation's foremost intelligence official, the DCI was charged with providing
"national intelligence"' 0 to appropriate members of government based upon all
information available." As head of the intelligence community, 12 the DCI was
given the responsibility to "protect intelligence sources and methods from
authorities and employee issues and dealt with other miscellany. See CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY,
FACTBOOK ON INTELLIGENCE, available at http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/facttell/genesis.html
(last visited Feb. 15, 2005) [hereinafter FACTBOOK ON INTELLIGENCE].
7. See Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones, Why Was the CIA Established in 1947?, in ETERNAL VIGILANCE? 50
YEARS OF THE CIA 21, 25-29, 36 (Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones & Christopher Andrew eds., 1997) (arguing
that the executive branch was largely inspired by its fear of communism, while "Pearl Harbor was the
burning issue" for the Congress).
8. RHODRI JEFFREYS-JONES, THE CIA AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 32 (2d ed. 1998).
9. See Jonathan M. Fredman, Intelligence Agencies, Law Enforcement, and the Prosecution Team
16 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 331, 335 (1998) ("The strict delineation between intelligence and law
enforcement was facilitated by the fact that, simply stated, there was relatively little overlap between the
two in 1947."). Long-serving FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover lobbied to defend the Bureau's intelligence
programs in Latin America and to reduce the power of the CIA during plans for its creation. Despite
Hoover's efforts, the reordering of the intelligence community under the National Security Act stripped
the FBI of its foreign intelligence work abroad. See generally CURT GENTRY, J. EDGAR HOOVER: THE
MAN AND THE SECRETS 324-27 (1991) (relating Hoover's machinations to protect FBI turf); AMY B.
ZEGART, FLAWED BY DESIGN: THE EVOLUTION OF THE CIA, JCS, AND NSC 168-69 (1999) (describing
FBI intelligence programs abroad).
10. The terms "national intelligence" and "intelligence related to the national security," referred to
"intelligence which pertains to the interests of more than one department or agency of the Government"
and did "not refer to counterintelligence or law enforcement activities conducted by the Federal Bureau
of Investigation except to the extent provided for in procedures agreed to by the Director of Central
Intelligence and the Attorney General, or otherwise as expressly provided for in this title." 50 U.S.C. §
401 a(5) (2000) (amended 2004).
11. 50 U.S.C. § 403-3(a)(l)-(2) (2000) (amended 2004).
12. The intelligence community comprises various agencies within the Federal Government,
including the intelligence arm of the FBI. See 50 U.S.C. § 401a (2000); Exec. Order No. 12,333, 46 Fed.
Reg. 59,941, at 59,953 (Dec. 4, 1981). This Note primarily refers to the FBI's law enforcement arm
unless specifically stated otherwise.
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unauthorized disclosure" 13 and to "perform such other functions as the
President or the National Security Council may direct."' 14 Critics of this
structure long decried the gap between the DCI's broad statutory duties (e.g.,
coordination of the intelligence community) and the limited power given to that
position (particularly the fact that the DCI lacked budgetary control over
agencies other than the CIA).15 Despite this criticism, the three separate roles
remained centralized in the DCI position until the intelligence overhaul in
2004.16
The National Security Act created and outlined the statutory responsibilities
of the Central Intelligence Agency. In doing so, the Act was careful to carve
out a sphere of activity for the Agency meant to remain separate from domestic
law enforcement. As head of the CIA, the DCI was required to "collect
intelligence through human sources and by other appropriate means, except that
the Agency shall have no police, subpoena, or law enforcement powers or
internal security functions."'17 Also as head of the CIA, the DCI was required to
"provide overall direction for the collection of national intelligence through
human sources by elements of the intelligence community authorized to
undertake such collection,"' 8 and "correlate and evaluate intelligence related to
the national security and provide appropriate dissemination of such
intelligence."' 9 The National Security Act also included important catchall
language mandating that the DCI, as head of the CIA, would "perform such
other functions and duties related to intelligence affecting the national security
as the President or the National Security Council may direct."
20
B. Categorical but Ambiguous Prohibitions
The critical realization in understanding the formation of the CIA is that its
prohibitions-like its mandated functions-were cast in broad and sometimes
vague terms. The National Security Act was clear and explicit in its desire to
prevent the CIA from partaking in law enforcement and internal security
functions and, to that end, marked the limits of the CIA mandate in a single
sentence: "[T]he Agency shall have no police, subpoena, or law enforcement
13. 50 U.S.C. § 403-3(c)(7) (2000) (amended 2004).
14. 50 U.S.C. § 403-3(c)(8) (2000) (amended 2004).
15. See ZEGART, supra note 9, at 187-88; David L. Boren, The Winds of Change at the CIA, 101
YALE L.J. 853, 864 (1992); THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT: FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL
COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES 409-10 (2004) [hereinafter 9/11
COMMISSION REPORT].
16. See infra Section II.F.
17. 50 U.S.C. § 403-3(d)(1) (2000) (amended 2004).
18. 50 U.S.C. § 403-3(d)(2) (2000) (amended 2004).
19. 50 U.S.C. § 403-3(d)(3) (2000) (amended 2004).
20. 50 U.S.C. § 403-3(d)(5) (2000) (amended 2004). This catchall language provides the basis of
statutory authority for covert action by the CIA. W. MICHAEL REISMAN & JAMES E. BAKER,
REGULATING COVERT ACTION 118-19 (1992).
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powers or internal security functions. ' 21 This proscriptive language is
categorical in nature. The prohibitions draw no distinction with respect to
citizenship (as to if and how CIA authority changes when dealing with a
"United States person"). 22 Likewise, these seemingly per se prohibitions are
silent as to geography. Thus, it is unclear what CIA activities may be
appropriate within the United States, and there is no indication these
23prohibitions would apply any less forcefully to CIA activities abroad. By not
defining the critical terms ("police powers," "subpoena powers," "law
enforcement powers," and "internal security functions"), the National Security
Act did not delineate the border between intelligence and law enforcement or
define what domestic CIA actions are acceptable. For these reasons, "the limits
of what the CIA can and cannot do are not clear."
24
The legislative history of the National Security Act provides little insight
into the prohibitions on CIA activity.25 Congressional intent with respect to
these prohibitions is opaque due to a relative lack of public debate on the
26issue. For instance, "the wording of the prohibition [on domestic activity] was
not specifically discussed in congressional hearings or debates," even despite
the fact that "several congressmen and witnesses expressed their concern that
the CIA neither invade the FBI's jurisdiction nor become a secret police."
27
The Agency's mandate was addressed in only general terms largely due to
the circumstances of the creation of the 1947 Act. Bureaucratic wrangling on
unrelated issues often eclipsed the creation of the CIA. The Truman
Administration sought to keep the details relevant to the CIA "brief and vague"
21. 50 U.S.C. § 403-3(d)(1) (2000) (amended 2004).
22. The term "United States person" is usually a term of art in laws pertaining to intelligence
collection and is often defined by statute. See, e.g., 50 U.S.C. § 403-5a(c)(2) (2000) (defining the term
as: "A United States citizen. An alien known by the intelligence agency concerned to be a permanent
resident alien. An unincorporated association substantially composed of United States citizens or
permanent resident aliens. A corporation incorporated in the United States, except for a corporation
directed and controlled by a foreign government or governments.").
23. Though Congress clearly did not intend for the CIA to assist law enforcement domestically,
"[c]ongressional statutes have been more ambiguous on the issue of overseas assistance by the CIA
towards investigations of foreign individuals and entities." Daniel Richard, Overseas Tasking of the CIA
for Domestic Law Enforcement, NAT'L SEC. STUD. Q. 1, 6 (Summer 1996). In 1996, Congress passed a
statute allowing for greater cooperation with law enforcement overseas. See infra notes 132-135 and
accompanying text. A geographical distinction was also drawn in a portion of the CIA mandate in the
recent intelligence reform legislation. See infra notes 105-108 and accompanying text.
24. Telephone Interview with Jeffrey H. Smith, former General Counsel of the Central Intelligence
Agency (May 18, 2004).
25. For background on the legislative history of the creation of the CIA, see generally GROVER S.
WILLIAMS, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY AS DOCUMENTED IN
PUBLISHED CONGRESSIONAL SOURCES (1975).
26. Courts have also remarked on the dearth of insightful legislative history. The Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia described the legislative history of the CIA charter as "sketchy." Weissman
v. Central Intelligence Agency, 565 F.2d 692, 695 (D.C. Cir. 1977). For additional background on the
lack of public debate, see WILLIAMS, supra note 25, at 2.
27. COMM'N ON CIA ACTIVITIES WITHIN THE U.S., REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT 54 (1975)
[hereinafter ROCKEFELLER COMMISSION]. See also WILLIAMS, supra note 25, at 87-89.
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because the intricacies of the CIA's mandate were viewed as less important
than "more contentious issues such as the secretary of defense's powers or the
Navy's autonomy. ' 28 Likewise, Congress "accepted the CIA provisions with
little comment or debate" because "[a]verage legislators had little incentive to
probe deeply into the CIA's design, and national security intellectuals had
bigger fish to fry" with respect to the unification of the military.
29
Contorted attempts to extract judicial wisdom as to the limits of CIA
authority are futile for various reasons. First, courts have been unwilling to
define relevant terms, set clear boundaries, or provide guidelines that would be
of ex ante value in determining the limits of CIA authority. Courts have
generally eschewed clear definitions and parameters on CIA domestic activity
to the point that many such decisions parallel a running joke about
jurisprudence on the definition of obscenity: Courts essentially declare they
will "know it when they see it"30 and rely on case-by-case determinations of
whether the CIA has overstepped its statutory bounds. 3' Though courts have
been quick to cite the need for domestic CIA activity in pursuance of its
"foreign mandate," they have refused to define the boundaries for such
activity, 32 including on issues such as the extent to which the CIA can conduct
national security intelligence investigations within the United States.33 Even in
the few decisions that directly touch on the limits of CIA authority, courts
refuse to define the terms of the National Security Act.
34
28. ZEGART, supra note 9, at 173. See also CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE: ORIGIN AND EVOLUTION 3 (Michael Warner ed., 2001), available at
http://www.cia.gov/csi/books/cia origin/Origin andEvolution.pdf (last visited Feb. 20, 2005) ("[T]he
military 'unification' issue overshadowed intelligence reform in Congressional and White House
deliberations.").
29. ZEGART, supra note 9, at 183.
30. See Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring).
31. As a case in point, Birnbaum v. United States, 588 F.2d 319, 331 (2d Cir. 1978), held that
certain CIA mail interception activities during the Cold War violated the Agency's charter because they
sought to obtain "information on matters of domestic, as well as foreign, concern." The "matters of
domestic concern" formulation is symptomatic of a one-time only test that does not clarify the threshold
or provide meaningful guidelines for the future.
32. In Fitzgibbon v. CIA, 911 F.2d 755, 764 (D.C. Cir. 1990), the court made what it called a
"rather pedestrian observation" that the CIA "must, at times, pursue domestically its foreign intelligence
mandate," without defining what domestic activities would be permissible. Sirota v. CIA, 1981 WL
158804 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), echoed a similar sentiment when it declared that "[t]he CIA can and does use
domestic sources for foreign intelligence activities" without further elaboration. Id. at *3.
33. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia said the prohibitions of the National Security
Act were "intended, at the very least, to prohibit the CIA from conducting secret investigations of
United States citizens, in this country, who have no connection with the Agency." Weissman v. Cent.
Intelligence Agency, 565 F.2d 692, 695 (D.C. Cir. 1977). The court returned to the issue a year later in
recognition of the uncertain limits of the propriety of domestic CIA investigation of American citizens
who have some connection to the Agency in Marks v. Cent. Intelligence Agency, 590 F.2d 997 (D.C.
Cir. 1978). In Marks, the court implied there may be "reasonable exceptions" to the seemingly
categorical prohibitions in the National Security Act but, rather than flesh out that assertion, concluded
only that "the interpretation of the 1947 law is a legal issue that relates to an area of tension." 590 F.2d
at 1002-03.
34. In United Presbyterian Church in U.S.A. v. Reagan, the District Court for the District of
The CIA Mandate
Second, relevant cases are almost without exception decades old, an
additional strain in light of a changing lexicon and the modem national security
environment. 35 Third, most court decisions that touch on CIA activity were
decided in the context of the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA).3 6 FOIA has
separate statutory considerations, including exemptions from disclosure of
information that do not necessarily depend on the specific intelligence
collection technique or the legality of CIA activity.37 Fourth, relevant cases
illustrate the tendency of courts to defer to the executive branch in issues of
national security and highlight how various doctrines used by courts to abstain
from national security cases pose roadblocks for potential plaintiffs.38 In the
words of Judge Goettel from the District Court for the Southern District of New
York in Sirota v. Central Intelligence Agency: "It has been previously
recognized that the judiciary is not the proper forum for investigating
intelligence gathering methods."
39
Even the primary assumption made in the statutory CIA mandate-that the
Agency would only concern itself with foreign intelligence-was unstated in
the National Security Act of 1947. The Act did not use the word "foreign" in its
statutory grant of authority, though the "legislative history of the Act clearly
shows that Congress intended the activities... to be related to foreign
intelligence." 40 Several statements in the floor debate underscored the belief
that the CIA "deals with intelligence outside the United States," is involved
"only with external security," and is "supposed to operate only abroad.' '41 Yet
whether, to what extent, and by what means foreign intelligence collection
Columbia dismissed on grounds of equitable discretion a claim by Congressman Ronald V. Dellums (D-
Cal.), et al., that challenged the constitutionality of Executive Order 12,333. 557 F. Supp. 61, (D.D.C.
1982). Congressman Dellums argued, inter alia, that deletion of a particular phrase used in a previous
executive order authorized the CIA "to conduct domestic activities constituting 'internal security
functions' prohibited by the National Security Act." 557 F. Supp. at 65. Rather than address the
definition of that prohibition, the court simply punted the issue and declared it was "unclear" whether
such domestic activities would violate the National Security Act. Id.
35. See infra Part III.
36. Freedom of Information Act, Pub. L. No. 89-487, 80 Stat. 250 (1966) (codified as amended at 5
U.S.C. § 552 (2000)).
37. See Sirota at *3.
38. As illustrations of this point, see United Presbyterian Church, 557 F. Supp. at 65-66;
Harrington v. Bush, 553 F.2d 190 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Halkin v. Helms, 690 F.2d 977, 982-84 (D.C. Cir.
1982). See also STEPHEN DYCUS ET AL., NATIONAL SECURITY LAW 146-91 (3d ed. 2002) (explaining
that courts "have often avoided deciding the merits of' national security cases "or have decided the
merits in favor of the government after only the most cursory review" using the doctrinal devices of
political question, standing, equitable or remedial discretion, and ripeness). One reason for this
deference is that constitutional issues lurk beneath the surface; intelligence activities involve inherent
executive authorities into which courts are often reluctant to delve. Telephone Interview with James W.
Zirkle, Associate General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency (Oct. 12, 2004).
39. Sirota, 1981 WL 158804, at *3.
40. 1 SELECT COMM. To STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE
ACTIVITIES, INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES AND THE RIGHTS OF AMERICANS, S. REP. NO. 94-755, at 136,
436 (1976) [hereinafter 1 CHURCH COMMITTEE]. See also ROCKEFELLER COMMISSION, supra note 27, at
11.
41. 1 CHURCH COMMITTEE, supra note 40, at 136 n.31.
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could occur within U.S. borders was left ambiguous. "The fact that the CIA is
restricted to activities relating to 'foreign intelligence' does not, of course, tell
us what those activities are and whether they may be conducted within the
United States.
42
The National Security Act sowed confusion not only in the meaning of its
terms, but also as to how those terms interact and coexist with each other. The
broad protection of "sources and methods" -a mandate of the DCI position as
head of the intelligence community until the recent intelligence reform4 3-
interacted with and sometimes modified other parts of the National Security
Act's limitations on CIA activity.44 "The restrictions on domestic activities in
the 1947 Act were not clearly defined, nor was the potential conflict between
these limits and the Director's authority to protect 'sources and methods' of
intelligence gathering resolved.A 5 The Act also did not delineate the CIA's
"role in conducting counterintelligence" or how those responsibilities were
affected by its other statutory mandates and prohibitions.
46
C. The Cost of Ambiguity
Ambiguous statutory restrictions, lax oversight, and political pressure from
the highest levels of government opened the door for a series of abuses by
various agencies in the intelligence community, including the CIA, during the
Cold War. Reports of domestic surveillance of U.S. citizens at home and covert
42. ROCKEFELLER COMMISSION, supra note 27, at 52. The Rockefeller Commission explained that
Congress expected some CIA activity would inevitably take place domestically despite the Agency's
focus on foreign intelligence because, at a minimum, the CIA "necessarily maintains its headquarters
here, procures logistical support, recruits and trains employees, tests equipment, and conducts other
domestic activities in support of its foreign intelligence mission," as well as conducts domestic
investigations "to maintain the security of its facilities and personnel." Id. at 11. Yet the Rockefeller
Commission went on to note that "whether Congress contemplated that the CIA would collect foreign
intelligence within the United States by clandestine means" was "[l]ess clear from the legislative
history," in part because "there was a general reluctance to discuss openly the subject of clandestine
collection." Id. at 53. Thus, "the absence of discussion of the subject provides little guidance." Id.
According to George Clarke, former Senior Attorney in the Office of the General Counsel at the CIA,
"Executive Order 12,333 made it very clear that if it was foreign intelligence, it was a legitimate
concern, interest, and mission of the CIA," so the CIA can collect foreign intelligence domestically if
the foreign powers in question "have a presence in the U.S." Interview with George W. Clarke, former
Senior Attorney, Office of the General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency (Oct. 12, 2004). In such
cases, "it is still foreign intelligence, though there may be additional steps or procedures for the CIA to
follow" to collect information on those groups domestically. Id.
43. See infra notes 98-99 and accompanying text.
44. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia declared the phrase "intelligence sources and
methods" to be "ambiguous" and set forth a definition of "intelligence source" within the context of the
National Security Act in Sims v. CIA, 642 F.2d 562, 570-71 (D.C. Cir. 1980), affd in part, rev'd in part,
471 U.S. 159 (1985). The Supreme Court, however, found that definition to be overly narrow and held
that "[a]n intelligence source provides, or is engaged to provide, information the Agency needs to fulfill
its statutory obligations." 471 U.S. at 177.
45. 1 CHURCH COMMITTEE, supra note 40, at 436.
46. Id. See also DYcUS ET AL., supra note 38, at 713 (explaining the National Security Act provided
"no rules to say when the CIA could play a counterintelligence role in the United States").
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actions against non-communist countries abroad sparked extensive public and
political uproar and prompted a series of governmental investigations in the
1970s. 47 These commissions uncovered an infusion of politics in domestic
intelligence collection as well as numerous acts on the part of intelligence
agencies based on what ranged from creative interpretations of key terminology
in statutory mandates to flagrant disregard of statutory prohibitions. A wide
variety of abuses perpetrated by the CIA and other components of the
intelligence community was unearthed, including that the CIA had operated
multiple "spying operation[s] against Americans" and "had been opening mail,
burglarizing homes, wiretapping phones, and secretly watching the movements
of unsuspecting individuals within the United States, all in violation of its
legislative charter.
' 48
The CIA participated in a mail intercept program to examine mail sent to
and from the Soviet Union beginning in 1952 and lasting until 1973. In the last
year of operation of this program, there were 4,350,000 mail items sent to and
from the Soviet Union. Of those, the CIA examined the outside of 2,300,000
items, photographed 33,000 and opened 8,700.
4 9 In addition to the
constitutional issues related to the First and Fourth Amendments,
50 U.S.
statutes specifically forbid obstruction or delay of the mails.
51 The CIA's mail
intercept program did not comply with postal regulations allowing for
examining and copying envelopes for the purposes of national security, and the
CIA acted in knowing violation of federal criminal 
laws.5 2
The most oft-referred to domestic program of the CIA carried the ominous
acronym of "CHAOS. 53 At the request of the President, the DCI established a
Special Operations Group within the CIA in August 1967 to examine the role
of foreign influence on domestic disorder. The activities of this group came to
be known as Operation CHAOS. Presidents Johnson and Nixon were
concerned by the civil disorder and violence that wracked the United States in
47. The most famous of the governmental committees was the Church Committee, which was
named after its chair, Senator Frank Church (D-Idaho). The House corollary was the Pike Commission,
headed by Congressman Otis Pike (D-N.Y.). President Gerald Ford also created a commission, the
Rockefeller Commission, chaired by Vice President Nelson Rockefeller.
48. MORTON H. HALPERIN ET AL., THE LAWLESS STATE: THE CRIMES OF THE U.S. INTELLIGENCE
AGENCIES 136 (1976).
49. ROCKEFELLER COMMISSION, supra note 27, at 20.
50. See U.S. CONST. amends. I, IV. For further background on some of the constitutional
sensitivities regarding obstruction of the mails in a national security context, see, e.g. William C. Banks
& M.E. Bowman, Executive Authority for National Security Surveillance, 50 AM. U. L. REV. 1, 41-42
(2000).
51. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1703 (2000); 2 SELECT COMM. To STUDY GOVERNMENTAL
OPERATIONS, FINAL REPORT OF THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL
OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES: FOREIGN AND MILITARY INTELLIGENCE, S.
REP. No. 94-755, at 139 (1976) [hereinafter 2 CHURCH COMMITTEE].
52. ROCKEFELLER COMMISSION, supra note 27, at 20.
53. For an overview of the nature of the CIA's activities in Operation CHAOS, see Halkin v.
Helms, 690 F.2d 977, 982-84 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
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the late 1960s and early 1970s and "were convinced American unrest was being
fomented and financed by communist sources. 54 In six years, Operation
CHAOS assembled approximately 13,000 total files (of which 7,200 files were
on American citizens), and a computerized database contained the names of
more than 300,000 persons and groups based on those files and related
materials.55 The Rockefeller Commission concluded that the "domestic
activities of Operation CHAOS unlawfully exceeded the CIA's statutory
authority" because the domestic data collected "exceeded what was reasonably
required" to determine if domestic groups had links to foreign powers.56 Other
commentators have been less nuanced in their assessment; Brian Freemantle
declared that Operation CHAOS "was a direct and positive contravention of the
CIA's charter, and it was thus illegal.,
57
In addition to the domestic activities of Operation CHAOS, a separate
program within the Agency run by the Office of Security monitored and
infiltrated domestic dissident groups in and around Washington, D.C. between
February 1967 and December 1968 "to determine if the groups planned any
activities against CIA or other government installations. ' 58 The Rockefeller
Commission concluded that such infiltration of dissident groups "went far
beyond steps necessary to protect the Agency's own facilities, personnel and
operations, and therefore exceeded the CIA's statutory authority., 59
Violations of the CIA mandate also occurred in the field of
counterintelligence. The FBI and CIA maintained an uneasy shared
responsibility in counterintelligence, and the division of labor during the Cold
War was such that individual intelligence agencies "would be responsible for
the security of their own employees. ' 6° This meant the DCI, "with statutory
responsibility for protecting intelligence sources and methods, but with
limitations on internal security functions, was presented with something of a
dilemma." 61 The exact "handoff' between the FBI and CIA posed problems
and, more to the point, sometimes involved the CIA in prohibited law
enforcement activities.62 The Rockefeller Commission "found nothing to
indicate that the CIA abused the function given it by the agreement" with the
FBI pertaining to initial investigation of CIA employees suspected of spying
54. BRIAN FREEMANTLE, CIA 122 (1983).
55. ROCKEFELLER COMMISSION, supra note 27, at 23.
56. Id. at 24-25.
57. FREEMANTLE, supra note 54, at 122.
58. ROCKEFELLER COMMISSION, supra note 27, at 26.
59. Id.
60. Scorr BRECKINRIDGE, THE CIA AND THE U.S. INTELLIGENCE SYSTEM 201 (1986).
61. Id.
62. Id. at 267. See also Frederick P. Hitz, Unleashing the Rogue Elephant: September 11 and
Letting the CIA Be the CIA, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 765, 770 (2002) ("The principal force pulling
the CIA into the domestic arena prior to the end of the Cold War was its shared jurisdiction with the FBI
in counterintelligence matters involving U.S. citizens and U.S. persons.").
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but that "[t]he agreement, however, involved the Agency directly in forbidden
law enforcement activities."
63
D. Lessons and Outcomes
The thousands of pages of reports and recommendations made by the
various commissions of the 1970s suggest that the vague terminology of the
CIA mandate was an important cause of CIA abuses perpetrated during the
Cold War. The lack of clear boundaries of authority provided no clear
guideposts to prevent good-faith efforts to protect the nation's security from
crossing the line to become overzealous and unnecessarily infringe civil
liberties. Similarly, statutory ambiguity provided fertile ground for political
abuse of the Agency at the behest of the highest levels of government. The
abuses were caused by a mix of convenient and disingenuous interpretations of
the CIA mandate and outright violations of the law. For these reasons, clarified
statutory limits as proposed in Part IV of this Note would provide better
boundaries for well-intentioned activities as well as a more meaningful shield
by which the CIA could ward off bad-faith directives intended to serve personal
or political ends.
Vague statutory language proved all too malleable in the face of the
nation's overriding fear of communism. The drive to win the Cold War and
undefined prohibitions with ambiguous parameters opened the door to creative
interpretations of authority. CIA excesses during the Cold War were excused if
not encouraged by the drive to defeat communism, which emanated from the
country's highest levels of political leadership. This created a situation of lax
oversight of CIA activities and a "climate of tolerance" in which there was a
"let them do what they need to do to get the job done" ethic in place from the
passage of the National Security Act in 1947 until the congressional inquiries
of the 1970s. 64
Such a national security environment allowed the CIA to justify domestic
and law enforcement activities through alternating overly narrow and overly
broad interpretations of its ambiguous statutory mandate. The executive branch
"interpreted foreign intelligence broadly" to include domestic intelligence-
gathering programs directed at U.S. nationals designed "to determine foreign
influence on dissident domestic groups."65 The same activity was also
63. ROCKEFELLER COMMISSION, supra note 27, at 14. The counterintelligence dilemma was largely
resolved after both the CIA and the FBI received criticism for their handling of the investigation of
Aldrich Ames. See DYCUS ET AL., supra note 38, at 714-16; 50 U.S.C. § 402a (2000); Exec. Order No.
12,333, supra note 12, at 59,945, 59,949.
64. Interview with Frederick P. Hitz, former Inspector General, Central Intelligence Agency, in
Princeton, N.J. (May 7, 2004). In the drive to root out internal subversion, even domestic intelligence
activities entering the realm of law enforcement produced no "outcry" on Capitol Hill because
"everyone wanted the CIA to get that job done." Id.
65. 1 CHURCH COMMITTEE, supra note 40, at 136.
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condoned by a "narrow[]" CIA interpretation of "internal security functions,"
despite the fact that "history indicates that at the time of enactment of the
National Security Act, threats to 'internal security' were widely understood to
include domestic groups with foreign connections" and "[t]here is no evidence
that by 1947 these investigations were considered foreign intelligence. 66 The
Agency later used an expansive interpretation of the DCI's obligation to protect
"sources and methods" as an additional statutory justification for operations
targeting domestic groups "whose activities, including demonstrations, have
potential, however remote, for creating threats to CIA installations, recruiters,
or contractors.
'" 67
Certain abuses perpetrated by the CIA were committed at the direction of
the highest levels of the nation's political leadership. An unreleased report of
the House Select Committee on Intelligence in January 1976 stated "[a]ll
evidence in hand suggests that the CIA, far from being out of control, has been
utterly responsive to the instructions of the President and Assistant to the
President for National Security Affairs.' 68  Similarly, the Rockefeller
Commission concluded there was "a pattern for actual and attempted misuse of
the CIA by the Nixon Administration" shown by White House requests for (and
CIA provision of) various documents and equipment (including alias and
disguise materials) that were used for "various improper activities," including
activities meant solely to "serve the President's personal political ends.' 69 Not
all of the intelligence abuses are attributable to "poor law," as "some of the
abuses by both the CIA and FBI were not because the governing law was lax,
but because senior officials" at the time "were willing to intentionally violate
existing law., 70 Without excusing the moral culpability of those who flagrantly
violated the law, the CIA's ambiguous statutory mandate inadequately shielded
the Agency from high-level political pressure to perform "improper"
activities. 71 Though obviously no solution to willful disregard of the law,
statutory clarification as proposed in Part IV would better define the boundaries
of lawful activity, and thereby facilitate more effective congressional oversight
as well as internal checks within the executive branch.72 A clarified law
66. Id. at 138.
67. Id. See also HALPERIN ET AL., supra note 48, at 137.
68. HARRY ROsITzKE, THE CIA's SECRET OPERATIONS 238 (1977).
69. ROCKEFELLER COMMISSION, supra note 27, at 32-33.
70. E-mail from Steven A. Cash, Chief Counsel & Staff Director, Subcomm. on Terrorism,
Technology & Homeland Security of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary (Dec. 23, 2004, 10:03:30 EST)
(on file with author).
71. Despite the transgressions documented in the 1970s, the prohibitions of the National Security
Act have been useful to the Agency in limiting the extent to which it engages in domestic and law
enforcement activity in which it does not want to involve itself. The prohibitions have traditionally
served as a "shield as much as a sword," meaning the "CIA always found that language very useful"
because the Agency did not want to get pulled into domestic activities. Telephone Interview with Jeffrey
H. Smith, supra note 24.
72. See infra Section IV.C; see also infra note 100 and accompanying text.
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enforcement prohibition might also better protect CIA employees acting in
good faith from the risk of criminal prosecution.
73
The lessons of the Cold War should not be forgotten in the modem struggle
to defeat terrorism. An all-consuming national security goal, a malleable
mandate, a lack of effective oversight, and political encouragement to "get the
job done" from on high create a recipe for abuse. Ambiguity of mandate denies
clear guideposts to Agency officials and those in positions of oversight of
Agency activity (even assuming the existence of the will to exercise oversight).
Nonetheless, as the next Section demonstrates, the CIA mandate remains
essentially unchanged to this day.
E. The Teflon Mandate
The CIA mandate was not altered in the wake of the uncovering of the
intelligence abuses, despite calls to do so by the relevant commissions. The
Church Committee lambasted the CIA mandate as "confusing and 
ill-defined ' 74
and declared that the National Security Act of 1947 was "no longer an adequate
framework for the conduct of America's intelligence activities" because it
"failed to provide an adequate statement of the broad policy and purposes to be
served by America's intelligence effort." 75 The Rockefeller Commission called
for further clarification of CIA authority to collect foreign intelligence within
the U.S. because the National Security Act "neither expressly authorizes such
collection nor expressly prohibits it. ' 76 In 1972, the President's Foreign
Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB) recommended that "the jurisdictional
lines" between FBI and CIA be clarified in order to facilitate the undertaking of
specific domestic intelligence activities.
77
A significant result of the outcry over intelligence abuses was the creation
of a labyrinth of congressional oversight of the intelligence community. 78 Once
73. During the Cold War, FBI agents W. Mark Felt and Edward S. Miller faced criminal charges
after performing acts requested by the country's political leadership but for which there was no statutory
authorization. See Gray v. Bell, 712 F.2d 490 (D.C. Cir. 1983). The prosecutions of Felt and Miller
"caused concern among those in the intelligence world because it created uncertainty whether CIA
officers, who believed that they too were acting at the direction of the President, would run the same risk
of prosecution." E-mail from Robert 0. Davis, former Deputy Counsel, Office of Intelligence Policy and
Review, Department of Justice (Feb. 22, 2005, 15:25:02 EST) (on file with author). A clearer statutory
mandate would provide protection to CIA employees superior to that offered by classified guidelines
pursuant to executive order. See infra Section IV.C.3.
74. 1 CHURCH COMMIrTEE, supra note 40, at 436.
75. Id. at 426.
76. ROCKEFELLER COMMISSION, supra note 27, at 59.
77. Id. at 73.
78. Congressional oversight of the CIA centers primarily in the Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence (SSCI) and the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI). The SSCI was
established on May 19, 1976 under S. Res. 400, and the HPSCI was created on July 14, 1977 under H.
Res. 658. The CIA "also reports regularly to the Defense Subcommittees of the Appropriations
Committees in both Houses of Congress" and "provides substantive briefings to the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, and the Armed Services Committees in
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in place, the congressional intelligence committees immediately took up the
mantle of intelligence reform, and a lengthy bill was introduced in each house
to create statutory charters for various components of the intelligence
community, including the CIA.79 Yet the "Charter Legislation" "was strongly
criticized from all sides in hearings; some arguing that it would legitimize
covert actions inconsistent with American ideals and others suggesting that its
complex restrictions would unduly hamper the protection of vital American
interests. ' 8° In the end, the bills were never reported out of committee. Similar
legislation proposed in the next Congress "came under even heavier criticism"
and ultimately met the same fate.
8 1
Several factors explain the downfall of the Charter Legislation. Its broad
sweep and comprehensive nature exposed it to criticism on many fronts, and
the size of the undertaking prevented agreement on its terms. The legislation
was supported, "in principle" by the President and the Congress, "but after
almost four years of legislative proceedings, the Congress and the Carter
Administration could not reach agreement on a comprehensive proposal for the
Intelligence Community's structure. ' 2 The legislation also included many "hot
button" issues, such as the historically contentious issue of covert action.83 An
additional problem was the slow speed with which Congress acted. 84
Instead of statutory revision of the CIA mandate, action came in the form of
executive orders. "Concurrent with, and subsequent to, these legislative
initiatives, the Executive Branch, in part to head off further congressional
action, implemented some of the more limited recommendations contained in
their respective proposals."8 5 Three key executive orders were issued by
Presidents Ford, Carter, and Reagan, respectively (with each successive Order
superseding the former) to organize and provide guidance to the intelligence
community. 86 The last of the series, Executive Order 12,333, was promulgated
both bodies, as well as other committees and individual members." FACTBOOK ON INTELLIGENCE, supra
note 6.
79. See The National Intelligence Reorganization and Reform Act of 1978, S. 2525, 95th Cong.
(1978). The House corollary was identical. See H.R. 11245, 95th Cong. (1978). Charter Legislation was
also introduced in the 96th Congress. See National Intelligence Act of 1980, S. 2284, 96th Cong. (1980).
80. RICHARD A. BEST, JR., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., PROPOSALS FOR INTELLIGENCE
REORGANIZATION, 1949-2004, at 26 (2004), available at http://www.fas.org/irp/crs/RL32500.pdf (last
visited Mar. 8, 2005) [hereinafter BEST, INTELLIGENCE REORGANIZATION].
81. Id.
82. Russell J. Bruemmer, Intelligence Community Reorganization: Declining the Invitation to
Struggle, 101 YALE L.J. 867, 884 (1992).
83. For background on the debate over covert action within the context of the proposed Charter
Legislation, see DYCUS ET AL., supra note 38, at 459-61. For additional background on the issue of
covert action, see Harry Rositzke, America's Secret Operations: A Perspective, FOREIGN AFFAIRS (Jan.
1975) reprinted in 1 CHURCH COMMITTEE, supra note 40, at 539 ("No chapter in the history of the CIA
is as public or controversial as its covert action program.").
84. Bruemmer, supra note 82, at 884.
85. BEST, INTELLIGENCE REORGANIZATION, supra note 80, at 26.
86. Exec. Order No. 11,905, 41 Fed. Reg. 7703 (Feb. 18, 1976); Exec. Order No. 12,036, 43 Fed.
Reg. 3674 (Jan. 24, 1978); Exec. Order No. 12,333, supra note 12.
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by President Reagan on December 4, 1981 and remains in effect to this day.
87
Executive Order 12,333 addresses both domestic collection of intelligence
and the relationship between the intelligence community and law enforcement.
With respect to the former, the Order attempted to clarify the division of labor
between the CIA and FBI with respect to domestic intelligence. According to
the Order, the CIA shall "collect, produce and disseminate foreign intelligence
and counterintelligence, including information not otherwise obtainable," but
collection of such intelligence within the United States "shall be coordinated
with the FBI as required by procedures agreed upon by the Director of Central
Intelligence and the Attorney General. 88 The FBI shall "conduct within the
United States ... activities undertaken to collect foreign intelligence or support
foreign intelligence collection requirements of other agencies within the
Intelligence Community. ' 89 Yet the door for domestic collection by other
agencies remains open "when significant foreign intelligence is sought...
provided that no foreign intelligence collection by such agencies may be
undertaken for the purpose of acquiring information concerning the domestic
activities of United States persons."90 Subsequent to Executive Order 12,333,
internal CIA guidelines issued by the DCI and approved by the Attorney
General placed additional restrictions on collection of intelligence information
directed at U.S. citizens by the CIA.
91
Executive Order 12,333 also provides guidance as to law enforcement
activities. The Order authorizes agencies within the intelligence community
"unless otherwise precluded by law or this Order, [to] participate in law
enforcement activities to investigate or prevent clandestine intelligence
activities by foreign powers, or international terrorist or narcotics activities.
92
This language indicates that participation of intelligence agencies would be
limited in scope and would not necessarily include bringing someone to justice
to enforce U.S. laws. Intelligence agencies are also authorized to "provide
specialized equipment, technical knowledge, or assistance of expert personnel
for use by any department or agency, or, when lives are endangered, to support
local law enforcement agencies" provided that assistance by expert personnel is
87. Exec. Order No. 12,333, supra note 12.
88. Id. at 59,945.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 59,950. Executive Order 12,333 also gave the FBI an explicit role in the production and
dissemination of foreign intelligence and counterintelligence. Id. at 59,949.
91. CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, CIA FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS, at
http://www.cia.gov/cia/public-affairs/faq.html#6 (last visited Mar. 8, 2005). Dating back to the 1970s,
"collection of intelligence information directed against U.S. citizens ... is allowed only for an
authorized intelligence purpose; for example, if there is a reason to believe that an individual is involved
in espionage or international terrorist activities." Id. CIA procedures in such cases "require senior
approval." Id.
92. Exec. Order 12,333, supra note 12, at 59,951 (emphasis added).
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approved by the General Counsel of the providing agency.93 There is also
catchall language allowing intelligence agencies to "render any other assistance
and cooperation to law enforcement authorities not precluded by applicable
law."
, 94
F. The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004
Major intelligence reform came in the waning days of the 108th Congress
in the form of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act.95 The Act
is largely based on the recommendations made in the final report of the
National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (the "9/11
Commission"), which took center stage in the legislative deliberation of
intelligence reform. Yet the 9/11 Commission did not speak to clarification of
the law enforcement prohibition or the domestic role of the CIA, and that issue
has so far escaped the attention of policymakers. 96
The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act restructured the
organizational chart of the country's intelligence community.97 The principal
93. Id. "The CIA may also provide support to other federal agencies through the temporary
detailing, essentially loaning, of Agency personnel, who then work under the authority of the receiving
agency rather than the CIA." Telephone Interview with James W. Zirkle, supra note 38.
94. Exec. Order 12,333, supra note 12, at 59,951.
95. The implementation of the Act's provisions-as well as the meaning of some of those
provisions-is to some extent still being worked out. "[T]here are a lot of government attorneys still
trying to figure out what some of the provisions mean." E-mail from James W. Zirkle, Associate
General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency (Jan. 31, 2005, 17:29:33 EST) (on file with author). See
also Douglas Jehl, The Spymaster Question, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 27, 2004, at A28 (quoting former CIA
General Counsel Jeffrey H. Smith as saying he found significant "confusion and contradiction" within
the Act and that "[l]awyers across the intelligence community will be arguing about what these
provisions mean for many months to come"); Philip Shenon, Next Round Is Set in Push to Reorganize
Intelligence, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 20, 2004, at A25 (describing the "daunting logistics" and potential "turf
battles" to be addressed in implementing the Act); Walter Pincus, Bush's Intelligence Panel Gains
Stature, WASH. POST, Feb. 7, 2005, at A19 (explaining "there is a recognition" on Capitol Hill that the
Act "may need some changes before implementation can be completed").
96. Porter Goss submitted legislation in the 108th Congress when he was chairman of the House
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (Goss was later appointed DCI) that would have
reconfigured the prohibitions on CIA activity. The proposed bill read in relevant part: "except that the
Agency may not exercise police, subpoena, or law enforcement powers within the United States, except
as otherwise permitted by law or as directed by the President." H.R. 4584, 108th Cong., tit. I, §
102(c)(1). The presidential exception caveat in the Goss language would have fundamentally undercut
the force of the prohibitions (unlike the proposals made in Part IV of this Note, which would clarify
rather than abandon sub silentio the prohibitions). The proposed bill received a generally negative
reaction in the media and on Capitol Hill. See Michael Isikoff & Mark Hosenball, Terror Watch: Goss's
Wish List, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 11, 2004, at http://www.msnbc.msn.conVid/5675992/site/newsweek. With
the brief exception of the Goss proposal, the idea to amend the prohibitions of the National Security Act
has received virtually no attention in the debates surrounding intelligence reform. E-mail from Steven A.
Cash, Chief Counsel & Staff Director, Subcomm. on Terrorism, Technology & Homeland Security of
the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary (Feb. 17, 2005, 07:47:36 EST) (on file with author). See also Isikoff
& Hosenball, supra.
97. Title I of the legislation, separately titled the National Security Intelligence Reform Act of
2004, replaced sections 102 through 104 of the National Security Act of 1947. IRTPA § 1011. For the
most part, the provisions of the National Security Intelligence Reform Act are required to take effect
within six months of enactment of the Act. IRTPA § 1097.
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change was the creation of a Director of National Intelligence (DNI) as the
nation's chief intelligence official. The three roles formerly consolidated in the
position of Director of Central Intelligence were parsed so that the DNI heads
the intelligence community and serves as the principal advisor to the President
on intelligence matters pertaining to national security. 98 The former position of
Director of Central Intelligence was stripped of those two roles and is now
simply the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (and is therefore
subordinate to the DNI). The DNI is charged with the responsibility (previously
held by the DCI) to "protect intelligence sources and methods from
unauthorized disclosure." 99 Among other duties, the DNI is also required to
"ensure compliance with the Constitution and laws of the United States by the
Central Intelligence Agency."'
100
Despite its dramatic restructuring of the organization of the intelligence
community, recent intelligence reform did not significantly alter the CIA
mandate. The key statutory language from the National Security Act of 1947
pertaining to the limits of CIA authority was preserved verbatim. The
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act mandates that the Director
of the CIA shall "collect intelligence through human sources and by other
appropriate means, except that the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency
shall have no police, subpoena, or law enforcement powers or internal security
functions."'' This differs from the old version by only a slight change in
phraseology: the prohibitions were previously directed at "the Agency" rather
than specifically at "the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency."' 0 2 This
discrepancy appears attributable to an innocuous change in drafting,'0 3 and
there is no evidence of any congressional intent to alter the limits of CIA
authority from the meaning intended in the National Security Act of 1947.104
98. IRTPA § 1011 (to be codified at 50 U.S.C. § 403). For background on the 9/11 Commission
recommendation to create a DNI, see 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 15, at 407-416.
99. IRTPA § 1011 (to be codified at 50 U.S.C. § 403-1(i)).
100. IRTPA § 1011 (to be codified at 50 U.S.C. § 403-1(0).
101. IRTPA § 1011 (to be codified at 50 U.S.C. § 403-4a(d)(1)).
102. 50 U.S.C. § 403-3(d)(1) (2000) (amended 2004).
103. Replacement of "the Agency" with "the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency" appears
to have been simply an inadvertent choice of phrasing most likely attributable to the hurried drafting of
the legislation. E-mail from James W. Zirkle, Associate General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency
(Jan. 28, 2005, 18:05:17 EST) (on file with author). According to Zirkle, the new law "is simply laying
out the authorities of the DCI in his new (and diminished) role as Director of the CIA, and imposing the
same restrictions as before." Id. For additional information on the rushed nature in which this legislation
was completed, see Philip Shenon & Rachel L. Swains, House Approves Intelligence Bill, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 9, 2004, at Al (explaining that, as of October 2004, many lawmakers thought it would "be
impossible to reconcile" the House and Senate versions of the intelligence reform bills); Richard W.
Stevenson, Confident Bush Outlines Ambitious Plan for 2nd Term, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 5, 2004, at AI
(explaining that President Bush called on the House and Senate to come to an agreement before the end
of the congressional term); Richard A. Posner, Important Job, Impossible Position, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 9,
2005, at A23 (explaining the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act was passed in "haste").
104. The legislative history of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act and previous
versions of intelligence reform using identical language indicate that Congress intended to continue the
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The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act does make one
notable statutory amendment with respect to the domestic authority of the CIA.
The phrase "outside the United States" was added to the responsibility of the
Director of the CIA to coordinate intelligence collection through human
sources. The amended language now reads, in relevant part: "The Director of
the Central Intelligence Agency shall... provide overall direction for and
coordination of the collection of national intelligence outside the United States
through human sources by elements of the intelligence community authorized
to undertake such collection .... ,105 The impetus for this addition appears to
have been the amended definition of "national intelligence," which was
broadened in scope in the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act.
The terms "national intelligence" and "intelligence related to the national
security" as originally defined in the National Security Act of 1947 did "not
refer to counterintelligence or law enforcement activities conducted by the
Federal Bureau of Investigation" except under limited circumstances. 106 The
scope of those terms was enlarged in 2004 and now refers to:
all intelligence, regardless of the source from which derived and including
information gathered within or outside the United States, that (A) pertains, as
determined consistent with any guidance issued by the President, to more than one
United States Government agency; and (B) that involves (i) threats to the United
States, its people, property, or interests; (ii) the development, proliferation, or use of
weapons of mass destruction- or (iii) any other matter bearing on United States
national or homeland security.
Thus, inclusion of the term "outside the United States" then became
necessary to preserve the role of the FBI in counterintelligence and domestic
collection of intelligence through human sources (by making clear that the CIA
does not direct the Bureau's domestic human intelligence collection
activities). 10 8 Furthermore, this provision as revised speaks only to the direction
and coordination of human intelligence (as opposed to other forms of
intelligence collection) and does not otherwise define what domestic activity by
prohibitions of the CIA activity as they were laid out in the National Security Act of 1947. For instance,
the House Committee on the Judiciary "supported the continued limitation that the CIA shall not have
police, subpoena, or other law enforcement powers" in discussing a proposed intelligence reform bill
with identical language to that codified in the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act. H.R.
REP. No. 108-724, pt. 5 (2004) (emphasis added). The Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs
expressed a similar sentiment when considering a previous version of the intelligence reform bill also
containing identical language: "The bill preserves the existing protections of civil liberties and
prescribes that the CIA shall have no police, subpoena or law enforcement powers or internal security
functions." S. REP. No. 108-359 (2004).
105. IRTPA § 1011 (to be codified at 50 U.S.C. § 403-4a(d)(3)) (emphasis added).
106. 50 U.S.C. § 401a(5) (2000) (amended 2004). See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
107. IRTPA § 1011 (to be codified at 50 U.S.C. § 401a(5)) (emphasis added).
108. This point is substantiated by the legislative history explaining the addition of an "overseas or
outside the United States" caveat in an earlier version of intelligence reform containing similar
language. The addition of the caveat was explained in terms of preserving the original prohibitions in the




the CIA would be acceptable.
The recent intelligence reform overhaul left unresolved the critical
ambiguities that have circulated since the CIA's inception in 1947. Key terms
are repeated and a longstanding question lingers: What exactly are the limits on
the CIA to operate domestically or conduct activity approaching law
enforcement? If anything, the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention
Act adds further ambiguity to the limits of the CIA mandate. The lack of
explicit geographical limitation with respect to the term "intelligence" in the
CIA's mandate to "collect intelligence through human sources and by other
appropriate means" is continued unaffected by recent reform.' 0 9 Meanwhile,
the greatly expanded terms of art "national intelligence" and "intelligence
related to the national security" are only qualified in one of their two uses in the
CIA mandate. The Act maintains the responsibility of the CIA "to correlate and
evaluate intelligence related to the national security and provide appropriate
dissemination of such intelligence" but does not add a geographical or
functional qualification." 0  In other words, the enlarged definition of
"intelligence related to the national security" arguably expands the scope of the
provision because it includes all intelligence (ostensibly even
counterintelligence and intelligence obtained from FBI law enforcement
activities) and there are no caveats (e.g. addition of the phrase "outside the
United States," as was inserted in the provision on human intelligence). This
further blurs the "handoff' between the FBI and CIA as to responsibility for
correlating and disseminating domestically collected foreign intelligence and
counterintelligence.
In sum, the legal mandate of the CIA has remained largely unchanged since
its inception in 1947. Though the abuses uncovered in the 1970s resulted in the
creation of explicit congressional oversight and limitations on CIA intelligence
activities involving U.S. citizens, there has been little definitional clarification
of the limits of CIA authority. That is to say, the abuses spawned regulation
preventing CIA infiltration of domestic groups but clarified little else. It is now
widely recognized that the CIA undertakes some activities domestically,'" but
the exact nature of those activities is not clearly spelled out, and the frontier
delineating where intelligence ends and law enforcement or internal security
functions begins remains murky. Part III examines how modem national
security threats are further complicating the issue.
109. IRTPA § 1011 (to be codified at 50 U.S.C. § 403-4a(d)(1)). See supra notes 40-42 and
accompanying text.
110. IRTPA § 1011 (to be codified at 50 U.S.C. § 403-4a(d)(2)).
I11. The view that the Agency is not allowed any domestic functions "has no serious support any
longer." BRECKINRIDGE, supra note 60, at 259.
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III. THE CURRENT NATIONAL SECURITY ENVIRONMENT
The meaning of the prohibitions of the National Security Act is even less
clear in the modem national security context. Previously, the national security
environment was dominated by the context of the Cold War and the specter of
Soviet espionage; domestic terrorism did not rank among the top national
security concerns. Indeed, in 1980, American Civil Liberties Union attorney
Frank Donner decried an alleged domestic terrorist threat as merely a
justification for intelligence excesses: "Political terrorism in its modem form-
politically motivated exemplary violence, indifference to human life, symbolic
targets, the intended creation of overwhelming fear-is not a serious problem
in the United States."'1 2 The national security environment that birthed the CIA
mandate faded into history with the end of the Cold War and the attacks on the
World Trade Center towers and Pentagon in 2001. The prospect of espionage
conducted by fellow nation-states in the context of a bipolar world has given
way to threats such as terrorism conducted by non-state actors operating both
domestically and abroad and pervasive transnational criminal networks. These
modem threats challenge both our lexical and jurisdictional distinctions.
Placing the CIA mandate in its proper place in the modern national security
environment serves two goals. First, it demonstrates that the modern national
security context has changed the usage and meaning of many national security
terms and concepts. This makes it even more complicated to understand the
boundaries of a poorly defined mandate approaching its sixtieth birthday.
Second, the modern national security context-primarily the fight against
international terrorism-has caused the U.S. government to reconfigure its
national security strategy. This new strategy aspires to create a seamless web of
capacity and information by bringing to bear all government resources-
including those of intelligence and law enforcement-in a unified approach to
counter terrorism and other transnational threats." 3 Though laudable and
necessary to win the war on terrorism, this new strategy will be less efficient
and risks unintended and deleterious consequences to the extent it mixes the
tools of intelligence and law enforcement without clarifying the vaguely
defined but categorical prohibitions in the CIA mandate.
Section III.A examines how modern threats challenge the traditional
112. FRANK J. DONNER, THE AGE OF SURVEILLANCE: THE AIMS AND METHODS OF AMERICA'S
POLITICAL INTELLIGENCE SYSTEM 457 (1980); see also MARC A. CELMER, TERRORISM, U.S.
STRATEGY, AND REAGAN POLICIES 44 (1987) ("Unlike some of its allies, the United States has not been
seriously affected at home by terrorism."); PHILIP B. HEYMANN, TERRORISM, FREEDOM, AND SECURITY
4 (2003) (explaining that "there was relatively little concern about prevention of [terrorist] attacks in the
United States" prior to September 11,2001).
113. This strategy is laid out in documents such as PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, THE
NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (2002), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.html (last visited Mar. 8, 2005); and PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED
STATES, THE NATIONAL STRATEGY TO COMBAT WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION (2002), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/12/WMDStrategy.pdf (last visited Mar. 8, 2005).
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language used in the field of national security. Sections III.B and III.C
highlight the melding of the spheres of "intelligence" and "law enforcement,"
and "foreign" and "domestic" to further illustrate how the modem national
security context places added stress on the language of the CIA mandate and
calls into question the compatibility of new CIA roles in the fight against
terrorism with its fifty-eight-year-old mandate.
A. The Transformation of the National Security Lexicon
The national security lexicon needs updating. Terms and concepts such as
"intelligence" and "law enforcement," "foreign" and "domestic," and "foreign
intelligence" and "counterintelligence" are losing their claity of meaning. The
meaning of the vague terms of the National Security Act have changed as the
fight against terrorism blurs the border between law enforcement and
intelligence and breaks down the distinction between the foreign and domestic
spheres. The definition of "foreign intelligence" is not nearly as crisp as it once
was, nor for that matter is the term "national security."'1 14 Even the few terms
actually defined in the National Security Act are under stress in the new
security environment. For instance, both components of "intelligence"
("foreign intelligence" and "counterintelligence") as defined in the Act include
"international terrorist activities" within their definition.
115
In a signal that the term "foreign intelligence" may be losing its currency,
recent intelligence reform redesignated the "National Foreign Intelligence
Program" as simply the "National Intelligence Program."' 116 As mentioned
above, the extremely broad definition of the terms "national intelligence" and
"intelligence related to national security" further blurs the lines between foreign
intelligence, the domestic collection of intelligence including
counterintelligence, and law enforcement activities.117 Even more broadly, the
dispute as to whether the struggle against terrorism is properly conceptualized
114. The post-September 11 focus on intelligence collection within the United States brought with
it the rise in prominence of the term "domestic intelligence." The direct effect has been reduced clarity
of meaning of the term "foreign intelligence." According to Steven Cash of the Senate Subcommittee on
Terrorism, Technology and Homeland Security, "[t]here is often confusion in the use of the term
'domestic intelligence.' Some people use that to mean [foreign intelligence domestically collected],
while others... confine its meaning to information about the plans, intentions and capabilities of non-
foreign organizations in the U.S." E-mail from Steven A. Cash, supra note 70; see also Gregory F.
Treverton, Intelligence Gathering, Analysis, and Sharing, in THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND
SECURITY'S FIRST YEAR 55, 64 (Donald F. Kettl ed., 2004) ("Much discussion of 'domestic
intelligence' or 'homeland security' intelligence lacks clarity .. "). In a similar vein, the term
"homeland security" has come into vogue and overlaps with numerous issues that had traditionally been
conceived under the rubric of "national security."
115. See 50 U.S.C.A. § 401a(l)-(3) (West Supp. 2002). The same is true for Executive Order
12,333, as the issue of terrorism continued to prove vexing from a definitional standpoint. Exec. Order
No. 12,333, supra note 12, at 59,953.
116. IRTPA § 1074 (to be codified at 50 U.S.C. § 401a).
117. See supra notes 10, 106-107 and accompanying text.
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as a "war" and the varying definitions of the word "terrorism" itself provide
fitting book ends to these challenges to the national security vocabulary. 
118
The definitional quagmire of the national security lexicon further
complicates the interpretation of the CIA mandate as laid out in 1947. If
guidance as to the meaning of the undefined terms in the CIA mandate could be
gleaned at least partially from their context and contemporaneous use in 1947,
the situation is complicated even further by the changes in context and
contemporaneous meaning of those same terms in the post-Cold War, post-
September 11 environment. For instance, the meaning of the term "internal
security" is even harder to decipher in the modem age; its connotation is
inexorably rooted in the Cold War and the term has fallen out of common
parlance. 119 It should therefore come as no surprise that the language of the
National Security Act is strained to adjust to an entirely different national
security environment over half a century later.12
0
B. The Breakdown Between Intelligence and Law Enforcement
The strict bifurcation between law enforcement and intelligence activities
assumed by the National Security Act no longer exists. The distinction between
intelligence and law enforcement activities is growing increasingly hazy as the
"long arm" of U.S. extraterritorial statutes reaches ever further abroad and
international intelligence issues reach ever closer to home. "Any distinction
between the requirements of domestic law enforcement and foreign intelligence
gathering are becoming hopelessly blurred in these new world disorders of
terrorism and proliferation."'121 Modem national security threats bring the CIA
118. See, e.g., Ashton B. Carter, The Architecture of Government in the Face of Terrorism, 26
INT'L SEC. 5, 9 (2002) (explaining how terrorism is "neither war, crime, nor disaster, as conventionally
understood"); Noah Feldman, Choices of Law, Choices of War, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 457 (2002)
(discussing crime and war as frameworks to conceptualize terrorism); Nicholas J. Perry, The Numerous
Federal Legal Definitions of Terrorism: The Problem of Too Many Grails, 30 J. LEGIS. 249 (2004)
(discussing the many different definitions of terrorism found in federal law).
119. The term "internal security" is historically associated with insurrection, particularly in the
context of communism (as in the Internal Security Act of 1950). "Internal security," according to Cash,
"is a term that dates back to the 1950s that is very rarely used anymore." Telephone Interview with
Steven A. Cash, Chief Counsel & Staff Director, Subcomm. on Terrorism, Technology & Homeland
Security of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary (Dec. 20, 2004). Hence, "there is ambiguity in [use of the
term "internal security"] because it is not a commonly used term with a commonly understood
meaning." Id.
120. Indeed, the National Security Act of 1947 "did not anticipate" the extensive growth and
evolution of the modem intelligence community or the initiation of congressional oversight. Telephone
Interview with James W. Zirkle, Associate General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency (May 11,
2004).
121. Hitz, supra note 62, at 772; see also Fredman, supra note 9, at 331-338; RICHARD A. BEST,
JR., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., INTELLIGENCE AND LAW ENFORCEMENT: COUNTERING TRANSNATIONAL
THREATS TO THE U.S. 2 (2001), available at http://www.fas.org/irp/crs/RL30252.pdf [hereinafter Best,
Intelligence and Law Enforcement]; Philip B. Heymann, Law Enforcement and Intelligence in the Last
Years of the Twentieth Century, 18 NAT'L SEC. L. REP. 1, 10 (Winter 1996); Tyler Raimo, Note,
Winning at the Expense of Law: The Ramifications of Expanding Counter-Terrorism Law Enforcement
Jurisdiction Overseas, 14 AM. U. INT'L. L. REv. 1473, 1481-86 (1999.).
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to the edge of the frontier of foreign intelligence and have engaged the Agency
in activities that skirt if not enter the realm of law enforcement.
In the context of countering terrorism, there are "bright but dimming lines"
between the FBI and CIA. 122 The struggle against terrorism as well as other
transnational threats has brought close cooperation between the CIA and the
FBI (as well as other agencies), including combined centers designed to pool
resources and enhance the agencies' effectiveness. In short, the fight against
terrorism and other transnational threats has dawned an era of co-location,
cooperation, and combined resources. In continuing this trend, the Intelligence
Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 established a National
Counterterrorism Center (NCTC),
123 a National Counter Proliferation Center,
124
and a Human Smuggling and Trafficking Center, 25 and also empowered the
DNI to establish National Intelligence Centers. 126 The recent intelligence
reform also calls for the establishment of a formal relationship between the
intelligence community and the National Infrastructure Simulation and
Analysis Center.' 27 Co-location and/or close cooperation of CIA and FBI
officials in joint centers on transnational threats raises statutory questions
related to law enforcement activities because of the nexus between CIA
intelligence and criminal prosecutions.
128
The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 also
supports an Information Sharing Environment (ISE) to promote the sharing of
terrorism information throughout the Federal Government.' 29 One of the policy
122. Telephone Interview with Rick Cinquegrana, Counsel to the Inspector General, Central
Intelligence Agency (May 11, 2004).
123. IRTPA § 1021 (to be codified at 50 U.S.C. § 4040). The primary missions of the NCTC are
inter alia: (1) "To serve as the primary organization in the United States Government for analyzing and
integrating all intelligence possessed or acquired by the United States Government pertaining to
terrorism and counterterrorism, excepting intelligence pertaining exclusively to domestic terrorists and
domestic counterterrorism," (2) "To conduct strategic operational planning for counterterrorism
activities, integrating all instruments of national power, including diplomatic, financial, military,
intelligence, homeland security, and law enforcement activities within and among agencies." IRTPA §
1021 (to be codified at 50 U.S.C. § 404o(d)(l)-(2)) (emphasis added). The NCTC will subsume the
Terrorist Threat Integration Center (TTIC), a counterterrorism center created in 2003. IRTPA § 1092.
Establishment of an NCTC was recommended by the 9/11 Commission. See 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT,
supra note 15, at 403-406.
124. IRTPA § 1022 (to be codified at 50 U.S.C. § 404o-1). This provision includes a national
security waiver at the president's discretion. Id.
125. The Human Smuggling and Trafficking Center shall, inter alia, "ensure cooperation among all
relevant policy, law enforcement, diplomatic, and intelligence agencies ... to improve effectiveness and
to convert all information" into intelligence that can be used to combat terrorist travel, migrant
smuggling, and the trafficking of persons. IRTPA § 7202 (to be codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1777).
126. IRTPA § 1023 (to be codified at 50 U.S.C. § 4040-2).
127. IRTPA§8101.
128. The lateral sharing of information by the CIA to law enforcement agencies for use in criminal
prosecutions "sounds a lot like law enforcement powers." Telephone Interview with Jeffrey H. Smith,
supra note 24.
129. IRTPA § 1016 (to be codified at 6 U.S.C. § 485). The legislative creation of an ISE continued
previous initiatives to improve the sharing of such information between government agencies. See Exec.
Order No. 13,356, 69 Fed. Reg. 53,599 (Aug. 27, 2004); Homeland Security Information Sharing Act,
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goals of the ISE is to "address and facilitate information sharing between and
among departments and agencies of the intelligence community, the
Department of Defense, the homeland security community and the law
enforcement community."' I30  The security of sources and methods of
intelligence is not mentioned as an explicit goal of the ISE, though the ISE's
stated attributes are to include protections of privacy and civil liberties.
131
The linkage of intelligence and law enforcement was explicitly recognized
by Congress in 1996 with a statutory addition to the National Security Act of
1947 directly pertaining to the collection of intelligence for law enforcement
purposes. 132 The revision, codified in 50 U.S.C. § 403-5a, provides that
"elements of the intelligence community may, upon the request of a United
States law enforcement agency, collect information outside the United States
about individuals who are not United States persons. ' 33 Such information may
be collected "notwithstanding that the law enforcement agency intends to use
the information collected for purposes of a law enforcement investigation or
counterintelligence investigation."' 134 The Senate report noted that the "CIA and
the [National Security Agency] currently interpret their legal authorities as
permitting them to engage in intelligence collection only for a 'foreign
intelligence' purpose" and noted the Aspin-Brown Commission's conclusion
"that the Intelligence Community may be taking to[o] restrictive a view
regarding whether intelligence assets can be tasked by law enforcement
agencies to collect information overseas about non-United States persons."'
' 35
The tearing down of "the wall" between intelligence and law enforcement
in the wake of September 11 allows for much greater sharing of information
between the two communities.' 36 The Uniting and Strengthening America by
Pub. L. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135, tit. VIII, subtit. A (2002).
130. IRTPA § 1016 (to be codified at 6 U.S.C. § 485).
131. IRTPA § 1016 (to be codified at 6 U.S.C. § 485).
132. See Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997, Pub. L. No. 104-293, § 814 (1996).
133. 50 U.S.C. § 403-5a(a) (West Supp. 2004).
134. 50 U.S.C. § 403-5a(a) (West Supp. 2004). For background on how this statute might affect
discovery requests of intelligence agency files during criminal prosecutions, see Fredman, supra note 9,
at 364.
135. S. REP. No. 104-258, at 35 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N 3945, 3980. According to
the Senate report:
The law enforcement proviso of the National Security Act was intended to prohibit the CIA
from infringing on the domestic jurisdiction of the FBI and from becoming a national secret
police that might be directed against U.S. citizens. These concerns are not present when the
Intelligence Community collects against foreign persons outside the U.S. At the same time, the
need to combat terrorism, drug trafficking and other transnational threats effectively requires
that the capabilities of the Intelligence Community be harnessed to support law enforcement
agencies as efficiently as possible.
Id. See also ASPiN-BROWN COMMISSION, PREPARING FOR THE 21ST CENTURY: AN APPRAISAL OF U.S.
INTELLIGENCE, REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THE ROLES AND CAPABILITIES OF THE UNITED STATES
INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY 41 (1996) [hereinafter ASPIN-BROWN COMMISSION].
136. "The wall" refers to a set of barriers to coordination and information sharing between
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Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act
(USA PATRIOT Act) amended the National Security Act to direct law
enforcement agencies to disclose to the DCI (now the DNI) foreign intelligence
acquired in the course of a criminal investigation pursuant to guidelines and
with some possible exceptions.137 Rule 6 of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure was amended to allow grand jury information involving foreign
intelligence or counterintelligence to be shared with "any Federal law
enforcement, intelligence, protective, immigration, national defense, or national
security official in order to assist the official receiving the information in the
performance of that official's duties."'
38 The USA PATRIOT Act also made it
lawful for foreign intelligence and counterintelligence to be shared more
broadly among federal officials.' 3
9 Additionally, the USA PATRIOT Act
allows federal officers conducting electronic surveillance and physical searches
under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA)
140 greater consultation
and coordination with federal law enforcement officers.
14 1 "The matters to be
consulted upon must pertain to terrorist threats, but there is opportunity for
definitional creep as the pressure for preventive action in this area of concern
intensifies."
142
intelligence and law enforcement officials. See 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 15, at 78-80.
"The wall" was extensively criticized after September 11 as having prevented necessary cooperation
between intelligence and law enforcement. See, e.g., Testimony of Condoleezza Rice, Assistant to the
President for National Security Affairs, Before the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the
United States 9 (Apr. 8, 2004), at http://www.9-1 lcommission.gov/archive/hearing
9/9 -
I ICommission Hearing_2004-04-08.pdf (last visited Mar. 24, 2005), reprinted in THE 9/11
INVESTIGATIONS 215 (Steven Strasser ed., 2004) ("In hindsight, if anything might have helped stop
9/11, it would have been better information about threats inside the United States, something made very
difficult by structural and legal impediments that prevented the collection and sharing of information by
our law enforcement and intelligence agencies."). For background on some of the policy reasons that
originally led to creation of "the wall," see generally Stewart A. Baker, Should Spies be Cops? 97
FOREIGN POL'Y 36 (Winter 1994-95).
137. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and
Obstruct Terrorism Act (USA PATRIOT Act) of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272, 388-89 (to be
codified as amended in 50 U.S.C. § 403-5b(a)). The USA PATRIOT Act and the Homeland Security
Act of 2002 also permit increased sharing of intercepted communications. See Homeland Security Act
of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135, 2257, § 896 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2517).
138. USA PATRIOT Act § 203(a). Rule 6 further allows the sharing of grand jury information
involving "a threat of attack or other grave hostile acts of a foreign power or its agent, a threat of
domestic or international sabotage or terrorism, or clandestine intelligence gathering activities by an
intelligence service or network of a foreign power or by its agent." FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(3)(D).
139. USA PATRIOT Act § 203(d) (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 403-5d (West Supp. 2003)).
As passed in the USA PATRIOT Act, this provision is due to sunset on December 31, 2005. USA
PATRIOT Act § 224. The Homeland Security Act extended the reach of that provision to allow
information obtained as part of a criminal investigation to be more easily shared with federal, state,
local, and foreign government officials. Homeland Security Act of 2002 § 897 (codified at 50 U.S.C. §
403-5d (West Supp. 2003)).
140. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-511, 92 Stat. 1783 (codified as
amended at 50 U.S.C. § 1801 et seq. (West Supp. 2003)).
141. USA PATRIOT Act § 504 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1806, 1825 (West Supp.
2003)).
142. Hitz, supra note 62, at 773.
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The law enforcement prohibition in the National Security Act may make
part of the destruction of "the wall" somewhat theoretical, despite the
expansion of coordination and information sharing between the FBI and CIA.
According to Stewart Baker, former General Counsel at the National Security
Agency, the CIA's dependence on law enforcement agencies for domestic
activities "may still be having an effect on what information they routinely get
access to, although that seems to be a controversial question because any
suggestion that there is still a 'wall' is not considered politically correct.' 143
Baker is "not totally convinced" that "the wall" is gone because it is difficult if
not impossible to work hand-in-glove with law enforcement without getting
into some issues that touch on law enforcement areas and would therefore be
prohibited by the National Security Act. 144 Nevertheless, the changes wrought
by the USA PATRIOT Act and subsequent legislation have received harsh
criticism from civil liberties groups and others who believe the USA PATRIOT
Act "puts the Central Intelligence Agency back in the business of spying on
Americans"' 145 and that abuses will result. 146
C. The Artificial Distinction Between "Foreign" and "Domestic"
Modem transnational threats are placing great stress on the jurisdictional
lines drawn between intelligence and law enforcement agencies. More to the
point, the foreign/domestic divide is oftentimes a distinction without a
difference in the fight against terrorism and other transboundary threats. This
causes ambiguities in the "handoff' and, in some areas, the division of labor
between the FBI and CIA in both the domestic and foreign realms.
It is conventional wisdom that previous distinctions between "foreign" and
"domestic" are archaic and counterproductive when addressing modem
national security threats. 147 This creates overlap between the interests of foreign
143. Telephone Interview with Stewart A. Baker, former General Counsel, National Security
Agency (May 10, 2004).
144. Id.
145. AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, HOW THE ANTI-TERRORISM BILL PUTS CIA BACK IN THE
BUSINESS OF SPYING ON AMERICANS, Oct. 23, 2001 at http://www.aclu.org/NationalSecurity/
NationalSecurity.cfm?ID=9157&c=I I (last visited Mar. 8, 2005).
146. See James X. Dempsey, Civil Liberties in a Time of Crisis, 29 HUM. RTS. 8, 9-10 (2002)
(arguing the USA PATRIOT Act's changes give the CIA "the benefit of the grand jury's powers with
none of the protections of the criminal justice system").
147. See, e.g., John Deutch, Arnold Kanter, & Brent Scowcroft, Strengthening the National
Security Interagency Process, in KEEPING THE EDGE 265, 268 (Ashton B. Carter and John P. White eds.,
2001) (explaining "there is no longer a clear distinction between foreign and domestic matters; an
example is combating terrorist groups, which have no national identity and may operate both in the
United States and abroad, and may include members that are U.S. citizens"); COUNCIL ON FOREIGN
RELATIONS, MAKING INTELLIGENCE SMARTER: THE FUTURE OF US INTELLIGENCE, REPORT OF AN
INDEPENDENT TASK FORCE (1996), available at http://www.fas.org/irp/cfr.html (last visited Mar. 8,
2005) (explaining "[t]he line between domestic and foreign issues is blurred if it exists at all" and that
the logic and evidence leading to such a conclusion "undermine the notion that only the CIA operates
abroad (and only abroad) while only the FBI operates domestically (and only domestically)").
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intelligence collection and domestic law enforcement. "The principal targets of
intelligence concern are no longer just political and economic developments
abroad that impinge on American national interests, but terrorism, the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and drug-trafficking, all of which
have domestic law enforcement ramifications." 148 There is also some tension in
the cooperation between the CIA and the intelligence arm of the FBI. The
Bureau's efforts to reexamine its traditional division of labor with the CIA
regarding management of intelligence sources abroad and foreign intelligence-
gathering within the United States have been a source of friction between the
two agencies.
1 49
Over time, the U.S. has enacted "long ann" statutes that extend the FBI's
investigative authority overseas and give the FBI worldwide jurisdiction over
terrorist incidents directed at U.S. interests. 150 The FBI's presence abroad has
steadily increased as FBI personnel work in U.S. embassies, interact and
cooperate directly with foreign law enforcement agencies, and often take lead
roles in overseas investigations of terrorist activities directed against United
States interests.151 FBI activity has increased outward while there has been no
corresponding shift of CIA responsibility inward. That is to say, the rhetorical
breakdown between the foreign and domestic spheres is recognized as a two-
way street but for the most part only has traffic heading in one direction.
Problems in the intelligence mission of the FBI received great scrutiny
following September 11,152 and numerous policy proposals were floated,
148. Hitz, supra note 62, at 771-72. Technological advancements in intelligence collection
techniques have exacerbated this phenomenon, as both the CIA and FBI can intercept both foreign and
domestic communications, thereby further "blurring the lines between that which is clearly domestic and
foreign." Id. at 771.
149. See Richard B. Schmitt & Greg Miller, FBI in Talks to Extend Reach, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 28,
2005, at Al; Dana Priest, FBI Pushes to Expand Domain Into CIA 's Intelligence Gathering, WASH.
POST, Feb. 6, 2005, at AI0; David Johnston & Douglas Jehl, F.B.I. 's Recruiting of Spies Causes New
Rift With CIA., N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 11, 2005, at A19.
150. See STAFF OF THE HOUSE PERMANENT SELECT COMM. ON INTELLIGENCE, 104TH CONG.,
IC21: INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY IN THE 21ST CENTURY 279, 281 (1996) available at
http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/house/intel/ic
2 1/ic2 1_toc.html [hereinafter IC21 STAFF STUDY];
Raimo, supra note 121, at 1473-1500; see also IRTPA §§ 6602, 6803.
151. See U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, COMBATING TERRORISM: FEDERAL AGENCIES'
EFFORTS TO IMPLEMENT NATIONAL POLICY AND STRATEGY 53-54, available at
http://www.gao.gov/archive/1997/ns97254.pdf (last visited Mar. 8, 2005); IC21 STAFF STUDY, supra
note 150, at 274. For additional background on the expansion of the American law enforcement
presence overseas, see generally David Johnston, Strength is Seen in a U.S. Export: Law Enforcement,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 17, 1995, at A1; Best, Intelligence and Law Enforcement, supra note 121, at 12; and
Testimony of Robert S. Mueller III, Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Before the National
Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States 1 (Apr. 14, 2004), at http://www.9-
I Icommission.gov/hearings/hearinglO/mueller.statement.pdf (last visited Mar. 26, 2005).
152. See, e.g., MARKLE FOUNDATION TASK FORCE, PROTECTING AMERICA'S FREEDOM IN THE
INFORMATION AGE 21 (Oct. 7, 2002) (concluding that "the FBI has no effective process for providing
intelligence on terrorism to policymakers or others outside the law enforcement community"); 9/11
COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 15, at 423-27 (explaining "the concern about the FBI is that it has
long favored its criminal justice mission over its national security mission" and making
recommendations as to how to improve the Bureau).
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including the creation of a domestic intelligence agency that would entirely
subsume the FBI's intelligence functions. 153 Ultimately, the Intelligence
Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act chose to continue the basic jurisdictional
breakdown between the nation's intelligence community (including the existing
domestic/foreign division of labor between the CIA and FBI) while seeking to
improve the FBI's intelligence capabilities and, more broadly, information
sharing among intelligence and law enforcement agencies.154
Continuation of the present course will mean closer cooperation between
the CIA and FBI law enforcement officials abroad on issues of interest to both
the intelligence and law enforcement communities and increased sharing of
information between CIA and FBI intelligence and law enforcement officials at
home. 155 The closer this cooperation becomes, the greater the risk of running
afoul of the categorical prohibitions of CIA activity laid out in the National
Security Act. The modem national security environment-and the U.S. strategy
as a result-call for an overlap and flexibility of approach and a level of
cooperation that is impeded by the CIA mandate. For that reason, the contours
of CIA activity domestically and internationally-be they in cooperation with
FBI officials abroad that approach law enforcement activities or dissemination
of intelligence on terrorist cells operating in the United States that could
approach internal security or law enforcement functions-should be based on
an explicit national conversation rather than the statutory legacy of a bygone
era.
IV. THE CASE FOR STATUTORY CLARIFICATION
Neither the reforms instituted after the intelligence transgressions in the
Cold War nor the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004
fully addressed the boundaries of CIA authority. Ambiguities have persisted for
far too long, and the struggle against terrorism and other transnational threats
provides even greater impetus to clarify the CIA charter. This Part examines in
closer detail the risks inherent in ambiguity of mandate and proposes draft
statutory language to clarify the CIA charter.
A. The Risks of Swimming in Muddy Waters
The demise of "the wall," an aggressive counterterrorism policy, increased
coordination between intelligence and law enforcement, and an already blurry
line between where one leaves off and the other begins may be setting the stage
for violations of the law enforcement prohibition in the CIA mandate. At the
153. The 9/11 Commission considered and rejected the proposal to create a new domestic
intelligence agency. 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 15, at 423-24.
154. See IRTPA Title II.
155. See supra note 113 and accompanying text; supra Section III.B.
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same time, thorough review of the line between intelligence and law
enforcement is necessary in order to ensure the proper balance between
protection of state secrets and due process in criminal proceedings.
1. Running Afoul of the Law Enforcement Prohibition
Various CIA activities could, depending on the circumstances, draw the
Agency into the proscribed realm of law enforcement. The overlap in interests
and the nature of international threats oftentimes lead to overlap in agency
jurisdictions between the CIA and FBI as well as other agencies. The CIA and
FBI may be interested in the same person or group for intelligence purposes or
for law enforcement purposes respectively.156 In such cases, the unclear
boundaries of the law enforcement prohibition require ad hoc decision-making
on the part of the Agency.' 57 In general, the CIA has taken the line that it can
"cooperate with and provide assistance to law enforcement as long as the
Agency does not conduct the activity itself.'' 158 According to James Zirkle,
Associate General Counsel at the Central Intelligence Agency, the CIA has
been "very scrupulous" in its interpretation of the law enforcement prohibition
and has avoided having to "finely tune" exactly where that 
line is drawn.159
The closest thing approaching a bright line test to date is the issue of
tasking (federal prosecutors directing the CIA to gather evidence on specific
156. See supra Section III.B. To add to the complexity, both the law enforcement and intelligence
divisions of the FBI may be interested in the same person for both law enforcement and intelligence
reasons. Moreover, the CIA and the intelligence arm of the FBI may be interested in the same
individuals or groups for intelligence purposes. See supra note 149 and accompanying text.
157. In the 1980s, CIA officials in the CIA Counterterrorism Center often relied on a classified
memorandum authored by Kenneth Bass (known as "the Ken Bass memo") that "set out the precepts of
the test for deciding whether or not an activity violated the law enforcement proviso." Telephone
Interview with Robert 0. Davis, former Deputy Counsel, Office of Intelligence Policy and Review,
Department of Justice (Nov. 12, 2004). The first step required by the memo was "that the activity take
place outside of the United States and that the activity be coordinated with the FBI so that it did not
infringe on their enforcement activities outside of the U.S." Id. The second requirement was whether the
proposed activity "was otherwise within the charter of the Agency" or, alternatively stated, whether the
CIA had its "own independent reason for doing this." Id.
158. Telephone Interview with James W. Zirkle, supra note 120.
159. Telephone Interview with James W. Zirkle, supra note 38. Those conversant with CIA
practice regarding the law enforcement prohibition frequently define certain activities, such as making
an arrest, as clear violations of the National Security Act. The line seems less clear for various other
activities that seem to approach police and law enforcement powers. "Traditionally, 'law enforcement
powers' has meant the ability to execute a search warrant, to make an arrest, and those kinds of
traditional law enforcement activities that are integral steps in the prosecution of criminal activity."
Telephone Interview with George W. Clarke, supra note 42. Activities that involve "arrests, searches,
seizures, [and] monitoring of purely domestic groups would cross the line" into prohibited law
enforcement activities. Id. Cash was more categorical, opining that, in terms of its usage in the National
Security Act, "we do not have a great idea of what law enforcement means." Telephone Interview with
Steven A. Cash, supra note 119. With respect to domestic electronic surveillance, the regime and
boundaries for such activity are much more clearly defined. See Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of
1978, Pub. L. No. 95-511, 92 Stat. 1783, (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 1801 et seq. (West Supp.
2003)); United States v. Truong Dinh Hung, 629 F.2d 908, 915-16 (4th Cir. 1980).
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individuals or groups to build a criminal case). Tasking would clearly represent
involvement in law enforcement and the CIA is reluctant to take operational
direction from law enforcement agencies. 160 However, as former CIA Inspector
General Fred Hitz explained: "I think we have resisted [tasking] to date but we
are a stone's throw away from it now.'' 161 Aside from direct tasking, CIA and
FBI operations to acquire evidence admissible in criminal trials also raise
questions as to whether such activities constitute "law enforcement
functions."
'1 62
CIA involvement in the apprehension of persons sought by law
enforcement authorities for purposes of prosecution can raise a host of thorny
issues. Though the exact nature of CIA participation is not often made public,
CIA planning and participation in raids and other operations designed at least
partly to bring suspects to justice in U.S. courts inevitably approaches law
enforcement activities. 163 This is particularly true in the case of "irregular
renditions." 164 "Renderings" in the context of political terrorism date back to
160. A CIA letter quoted by the Federal Circuit in 1989 explained that, due to the law enforcement
prohibition of the National Security Act, "Agency employees are not tasked with responsibilities relating
to enforcement of U.S. laws or the apprehension or detention of persons suspected or convicted of
offenses against the criminal laws of the United States." Carew v. Office of Personnel Management, 878
F.2d 366, 368 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
161. Interview with Frederick P. Hitz, supra note 64.
162. Joint FBI and CIA counterterrorism operations to recover evidence for use in criminal trials
have been ongoing for some time. See Counter-Terrorism Efforts and the Events Surrounding the
Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001 Before the Joint Hearing of the House Permanent Select
Comm. on Intelligence and the Senate Select Comm. on Intelligence, 107th Cong. (2002) (statement of
Louis J. Freeh, former Director, Federal Bureau of Intelligence), 2002 WL 31266173 (explaining "[ajs
these Committees have known for several years, the FBI and the CIA have carried out joint operations
around the world to disrupt, exploit and recover evidence on Al Qaeda operatives who have targeted the
United States," and such operations were "in part designed to obtain admissible evidence").
163. See Best, Intelligence and Law Enforcement, supra note 121 ("The [Congressional Research
Service] report notes the employment of covert actions by intelligence agencies in certain law
enforcement efforts"); and Dir. of Cent. Intelligence, Support to the War on Terrorism and Homeland
Security, in THE 2002 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY (Jan.
2003), available at http://www.cia.gov/cia/reports/AnnRpt_2002 swtandhas.html ("CIA, with FBI and
the Department of Defense (DoD), devised a campaign of coordinated raids on several al-Qa'ida-
affiliated nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) that led to the indictment and arrest of at least one
group leader.").
164. "Irregular renditions.., occur outside the parameters of extradition treaties," often as a result
of "frustration at either the pace of the extradition process or the unwillingness of a country with whom
the United States has a valid extradition treaty to render an individual to the United States to face trial."
COUNTERTERRORISM THREAT ASSESSMENT AND WARNING UNIT NAT'L SEC. Div., FED. BUREAU OF
INVESTIGATION, TERRORISM IN THE UNITED STATES 1997, at 15 (1997); see also RICHARD A. CLARKE,
AGAINST ALL ENEMIES: INSIDE AMERICA'S WAR ON TERROR 143 (2004) ("Snatches, or more properly
'extraordinary renditions,' were operations to apprehend terrorists abroad, usually without the
knowledge of and almost always without public acknowledgment of the host government."). One well-
known example involves the apprehension of Fawaz Yunis, a Lebanese citizen brought to the U.S. to
stand trial for air piracy, conspiracy, and hostage taking. According to the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia, "[i]mmediately after the hijacking, several United States agencies, led by the
Federal Bureau of Investigation, sought to identify, locate and capture the hijackers." U.S. v. Yunis, 867
F.2d 617, 618 (D.C. Cir. 1989). Close cooperation between the CIA and FBI also occurred in the multi-
year search for Mir Aimal Kasi, who was apprehended in Pakistan, brought to the U.S., and convicted of
capital murder and related offenses in connection with the shooting of CIA employees. Kasi v.
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the 1980s and the dividing line was essentially determined to be CIA officers
would not be directly involved in the physical apprehension of the suspect or
transport of the suspect to the United States. 165 However, according to Richard
Clarke, former National Coordinator for Security, Infrastructure Protection, and
Counterterrorism, "[s]ometimes FBI arrest teams, sometimes CIA personnel,
had been regularly dragging terrorists back to stand trial in the United States or
flying them to incarceration in other countries." 166 The division of labor in such
operations could raise hackles in the face of the murky law enforcement
proviso. In a similar vein, CIA participation in interdictions on the high seas
can also be problematic.
167
2. State Secrets and Due Process
The ever-closer relationship between intelligence and law enforcement
poses problems in protecting sources and methods of intelligence information.
Specifically, close cooperation between intelligence and law enforcement
agencies can expose intelligence information to Brady requests in criminal
trials. 168 According to Baker, "[t]here will be surprising consequences in
sources and methods and attacks on legality of intelligence agency conduct and
efforts to use Brady to get inquiries into intelligence operations on behalf of
terrorist suspects. Those are not solved yet."'1 69 The boundaries of what
governmental information may or may not be considered exculpatory are
complicated by the unique nature of intelligence products. Baker explains:
The future relations [between law enforcement and intelligence agencies] could be
jeopardized by the way criminal defense lawyers treat analytical reports in the
hopes that alternative theories for who committed the terrorist act could be
identified and, since analytical reports are often a bit speculative or include stray
bits of information that are later decided to not be part of the story, it would not be
Commonwealth 508 S.E.2d 57 (Va. 1998).
165. Interview with Frederick P. Hitz, former Inspector General, Central Intelligence Agency, in
Princeton, N.J. (Apr. 7, 2004).
166. CLARKE, supra note 164, at 143.
167. The CIA "has cooperated in interdictions on the high seas-that is a law enforcement
function." Interview with Frederick P. Hitz, supra note 165.
168. The Supreme Court has held that prosecutors cannot withhold from a criminal defendant
information that is favorable to the defendant and is material to guilt or punishment. Brady v. Maryland,
373 U.S. 83 (1963). The "Jencks Act" and the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provide additional
means of discovery. See 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (2000); FED. R. CRIM. P. 16.
169. Telephone Interview with Stewart A. Baker, supra note 143. See also Mark D. Villaverde,
Note, Structuring the Prosecutor's Duty to Search the Intelligence Community for Brady Material, 88
CORNELL L. REv. 1471, 1475 (2003) ("Despite its necessity, greater cooperation between law
enforcement and the intelligence community may undermine the government's ability to pursue
prosecution referrals of international terrorists because of the threat that such prosecutions pose to the
disclosure of classified information."). See generally Fredman, supra note 9, (discussing issues of
discovery and Brady material in the time period prior to the legislative changes made in the wake of
September 11).
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hard to find exculpatory information in the reports.'7°
No statute addresses the degree to which intelligence community files may be
subject to a defendant's right to discovery or a prosecutor's duty to search.171
The government "can argue that it is not required to search all intelligence
agency files for any trace of such information unless the agency has 'aligned'
itself with the Department of Justice during the criminal investigation."'172 In
practice, however, alignment is often accepted as "a cost of doing business."', 73
According to Jonathan Fredman, Associate General Counsel at the Central
Intelligence Agency, the importance of the counterterrorism mission leads the
CIA to share its information with law enforcement and simply to "deal with
discovery requests as they come about."' 74 Fredman cautions, though, that as
reflected in the United States Attorneys' Manual, the conduct of discovery
searches is not "cost-free. ' 175 The opportunity cost of discovery requests means
resources are diverted from ongoing operations in order to locate and review
documents for possible production. Many times, because of their specific
expertise the only persons who can conduct those searches are the very same
persons who otherwise would be conducting substantive intelligence
operations. 176 "Where warranted by Brady, the Jencks Act, or Rule 16, of
course, these costs of compliance are legitimate; but the conduct of unnecessary
searches in response to a litigant's 'fishing expedition' diverts time and effort
from oft-times critical national security operations.' 7 7 Herein lies the critical
need to ensure due process while also respecting the resource constraints of the
intelligence community.
Use of intelligence information in judicial proceedings "may compromise
the security of the information itself.., as well as the sources and methods by
170. Telephone Interview with Stewart A. Baker, supra note 143. For additional background on the
differences in standards and content of information between the intelligence and law enforcement
communities, see Treverton, supra note 114, at 63.
171. Fredman, supra note 9, at 338-39.
172. Ronald J. Sievert, War on Terrorism or Global Law Enforcement Operation? 78 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 307, 339 (2003). See also, Fredman, supra note 9, at 347, 354-55, 367-68; Richard, supra
note 23, at 12-13 ("This loss of control presents a tremendous threat to the CIA and makes CIA officials
leery about supporting a tasking policy that encourages greater cooperation with the Department of
Justice and exposes them to being 'aligned' with the prosecution.").
173. Telephone Interview with Jonathan M. Fredman, Associate General Counsel, Central
Intelligence Agency (Nov. 30, 2004).
174. Id. Fredman predicts "[wie may start to see this same congruence in the issue of proliferation"
as well. Id.
175. E-mail from Jonathan M. Fredman, Associate General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency
(Feb. 23, 2005, 17:03:21 EST) (on file with author). See generally UNITED STATES DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
UNITED STATES ATrORNEYS' MANUAL, TITLE 9 CRIMINAL Div., ch. 90.210 (1998), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/eousa/foia-readingroom/usam/title9/9Omerm.html#9-90.2 10 (describing
Department of Justice policy as to contacts with the intelligence community pertaining to criminal
investigations or prosecutions).




which it was collected."' 178 Disclosure of sources and methods can cause the
loss of secret intelligence sources and endanger national security. 179 The
Classified Information Procedures Act (CIPA) 18  seeks to protect such
information from public disclosure, but the use of CIPA "is not foolproof."'
181
It is also possible that, absent sufficient protections for classified
information, the prospect of future Brady requests could change the manner in
which intelligence products are presented and thereby reduce their utility for
policymakers. This could occur if CIA analysts began to present information
with an eye to preventing the disclosure of sources and methods in response to
possible Brady requests rather than with the goal of providing policymakers all
of the relevant known information. At the same time, withholding relevant
information during criminal proceedings could violate due process and result in
lost criminal convictions of suspected terrorists.
The interrogation of detainees has also highlighted the importance of
further examining cooperation between intelligence and law enforcement. The
primary goal of military and CIA interrogators is to extract useful intelligence
information. In contrast, FBI agents participating in interrogations abroad seek
evidence that is admissible in U.S. courts, which raises questions as to the
application of the Fifth Amendment and Miranda rights.' 82 According to press
reports, senior FBI officials directed the Bureau's agents to "stay out of many
of the interviews of the high-level detainees" in Iraq for fear that "the
interrogation techniques, which would be prohibited in criminal cases, could
9183compromise their agents in future criminal cases .... " This tension also
178. DYCUS ET AL., supra note 38, at 870. The security of information and sources and methods can
be compromised "when information about a defendant or her conduct was obtained from classified
sources or methods, where the charged conduct or a related activity is itself secret, or where contextual
evidence involving the defendant's state of mind (and, sometimes, relationship to our intelligence
agencies) is classified." Id. See also Heymann, supra note 121, at 11-12 (discussing the sensitivities of
"extensive access of judges and short-term prosecutors to highly sensitive national security
information").
179. See Heymann, supra note 121, at 10 ("Gathering information for law enforcement by using
expensive intelligence capacities that have been built for other purposes has a very small marginal cost
in dollars or political fallout. Its real cost is in risk to the secrecy about the sources and methods on
which we rely for protection against dangerous surprises by hostile nations.").
180. Classified Information Procedures Act, 94 Stat. 2025 (1980) (codified as amended at 18
U.S.C. app. 696 (West Supp. 2003)).
181. Sievert, supra note 172, at 340.
182. See Sievert, supra note 172, at 317-20, 327 (explaining that "application of the Fifth
Amendment to extraterritorial interrogation of terrorist suspects is highly problematic for those
interested in combating terrorism in the courts" because "it is far from certain" that government
arguments justifying statements by non-Mirandized suspects will be accepted in court").
183. James Risen et al., Harsh C.I.A. Methods Cited in Top Qaeda Interrogations, N.Y. TIMES,
May 13, 2004, at Al. See also Douglas Jehl et al., C.IA. Is Seen As Seeking New Role on Detainees,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 16, 2005, at A16; Neil A. Lewis & David Johnston, New F.B.I. Files Describe Abuse
ofIraq Inmates, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 21, 2004, at Al. The Senate version of intelligence reform legislation
in the 108th Congress would have made prohibitions of the use of torture or inhumane treatment
applicable to intelligence officers during interrogatiois, but the measure was scuttled at the request of
the White House. Douglas Jehl & David Johnston, White House Fought New Curbs on Interrogations,
Officials Say, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 13, 2005, at Al.
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arose in the capture and interrogation of American Taliban soldier John Walker
Lindh and high-ranking al Qaeda member Abu Zubaydah.' 84 Furthermore, the
CIA has an institutional interest in preventing its agents from interrogating
suspects to obtain evidence for use in court because such activity could destroy
the "cover" of CIA agents called to testify as witnesses.
185
The murky line between intelligence and law enforcement may bring
harmful consequences if left unresolved. Criminal convictions could be lost if a
court disliked the involvement of the CIA in the apprehension of the suspect.
An alternative scenario, though by no means any more desirable, is that the
current climate of the consensus on fighting terrorism could cause a court to
creatively work around legal restrictions pertaining to the evidence or methods
in question in order to prevent having to release an accused terrorist. In that
case, the result may be "bad law" in which strained interpretations of the law
enforcement prohibition open the door to future abuses. Yet another possible
risk would be an increased reliance on plea bargains or selective prosecution
due to concerns regarding CIA involvement in the case (in the apprehension of
the suspect or the gathering of evidence) or because of fears of disclosure of
sources and methods of intelligence information. Clarification of the CIA
mandate and the "handoff' with law enforcement, as well as a greater focus on
the protection of sources and methods of intelligence, would help mitigate these
risks.
B. The War on Terror
The exigencies of the fight against terrorism clearly demonstrate two sides
of the need for a clearer CIA mandate: (1) to prevent violations of civil liberties
such as those that occurred in the Cold War and (2) to maximize the efficiency
of cooperation between law enforcement and intelligence. History indicates that
abuses can arise when ambiguously defined mandates are reinterpreted during
times of extreme national security crisis. Aside from the potential for abuse, the
war on terrorism and the U.S. national security strategy demand that the
intelligence and law enforcement communities work hand-in-glove. An unclear
CIA mandate is not conducive to this.
A handful of commissions and thousands of pages of reports and
recommendations made clear that zealous pursuit of a national security mission
must be constrained by an adequate statutory infrastructure and equally
rigorous oversight. The history of the Cold War illustrates that lax oversight
and domestic fear can create a culture of tolerance for intelligence abuses. The
fight to defeat communism was seen as a zero-sum struggle paramount to all
other concerns, including the abuse of civil liberties or the "niceties" of
184. See Sievert, supra note 172, at 317.
185. Telephone Interview with James W. Zirkle, supra note 38.
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statutory limitations, and the CIA was encouraged in this direction by leaders at
the highest levels of political authority.
186
Terrorism is a national security threat that has united the nation and could
create the same climate of tolerance of abuse that prevailed during the Cold
War.' 87 The U.S. government is now singularly focused on domestic security
and the present day fight against terrorism is portrayed as and perceived by
policymakers to be an all-out, multi-front struggle that "knows no borders."
This struggle is, as the title of this Note suggests, commonly thought of and
described as a "war." In today's fight against terror, ambiguous prohibitions on
CIA activity could facilitate future civil liberties abuses. 188 In terms of the
limits on CIA authority, the legal restraints are the same as before September
11, but they "may have been reinterpreted."'
' 89
On the other extreme, ambiguity in the boundaries of the law enforcement
prohibition could hamper the U.S. response to terrorism and other
transboundary national security threats by deterring cooperation between law
enforcement and intelligence. According to the IC21 Commission, one of the
results of the intelligence scandals of the 1970s "was that the two communities
tended to further distance themselves from one another over concern about
further inadvertent missteps.' 190 Likewise, the Aspin-Brown Commission
concluded that "some clarification of existing law would be helpful" in
fostering improved cooperation between intelligence and law enforcement
agencies because the "[flack of clear legal authorities has resulted in
confusion-inside individual intelligence agencies, between different
intelligence agencies, and within the law enforcement community-regarding
what activities intelligence agencies can conduct to support law
enforcement."' 91 These concerns are all the more pressing when viewed in light
of jurisdictional questions and definitional problems caused by the nature of
186. See supra Section II.D.
187. In discussing such disturbing hypotheticals, Judge Prettyman's remarks in the context of the
Fourth Amendment appear particularly apposite: "[W]e are dealing with doctrines and not with
presumable taste and sense of individual officials. Maybe none of these examples would ever occur. But
the question before us is not whether they would happen but whether they legally could." District of
Columbia v. Little, 178 F.2d 13, 18-19 (D.C. Cir. 1949), aff'don other grounds, 339 U.S. 1 (1950).
188. The Church Committee noted this natural tendency of domestic intelligence collection: "In
time of crisis, the Government will exercise its power to conduct domestic intelligence activities to the
fullest extent. The distinction between legal dissent and criminal conduct is easily forgotten." 2 CHURCH
COMMITTEE, supra note 51, at 289. As an illustration of the dangers of ambiguous statutory language,
recall the Church Committee's finding that the CIA "interpreted the internal security prohibition
narrowly to exclude investigations of domestic activities of American groups for the purpose of
determining foreign associations." I CHURCH COMMITTEE, supra note 40, at 138. See supra note 66 and
accompanying text. Similar issues can present themselves in investigating and ascertaining intelligence
on domestic groups suspected of foreign terrorist connections. Indeed, an important facet of the struggle
against terrorism is ferreting out front organizations for terrorist groups (such as certain ostensibly
charitable organizations) operating in the United States.
189. Telephone Interview with Stewart A. Baker, supra note 143.
190. IC21 STAFF STUDY, supra note 150, at 272.
191. AspiN-BROWN COMMISSION, supra note 135, at 41.
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terrorism and other international threats.
192
Hence, preventing abuse and lost convictions is only half the story;
clarifying the CIA mandate with respect to domestic and law enforcement type
activities can capture advantages such as improved coordination with law
enforcement agencies (particularly in avoiding an overly cautious or
"conservative" approach on the part of the CIA to activities that approach law
enforcement), and greater efficiency in the fight against terrorism and other
transnational threats. Additionally, clarification of the CIA mandate could
bolster public confidence in the mission and activities of the Agency and might
help allay concerns on the part of civil libertarians about post-September 11
intelligence reforms. 193 According to Paul Pillar of the National Intelligence
Council, "among the most effective weapons the United States has in fighting
terrorism is the long-term strength of its intelligence agencies, based in part on
their integrity and the trust they have with the American people."'194 Finally, the
sensitivities inherent in intelligence collection in a democracy argue in favor of
clear and transparent governing authorities for their own sake.
C. Alternatives to and Disadvantages of Statutory Amendment
A review of the alternatives to statutory clarification of the CIA mandate
reveals that, despite its possible disadvantages, formal amendment of the CIA
charter represents the best policy solution to the dilemmas discussed in this
Note. This Section discusses the primary alternatives to legislative action:
reliance on the courts, congressional oversight, and use of presidential guidance
documents. This Section then examines the possible drawbacks to formal
amendment of the CIA mandate.
1. Courts
Courts are not the most effective means by which to prevent abuses from
the intelligence community. Case law demonstrates a strong reluctance by
courts to define the terms of the CIA mandate or otherwise delineate the
boundaries of the Agency's authority.' 95 More disturbing is the reluctance of
192. See supra Part III.
193. See ROCKEFELLER COMMISSION, supra note 27, at 12 ("Greater public awareness of the limits
of the CIA's domestic authority would do much to reassure the American people."). This argument takes
on additional weight when the CIA is viewed in the context of the unique U.S. political culture with
respect to intelligence. See JEFFREYS-JONES, supra note 8, at 249 ("American antipathy to state
espionage, secrecy, and intrusiveness had historical roots and continues to the present day.") The CIA
has a special prominence within that culture because, although it is only one of many components of the
intelligence community, "for most Americans, the CIA is U.S. intelligence." ASPIN-BROWN
COMMISSION, supra note 135, at 61.
194. Paul R. Pillar, Intelligence, in ATTACKING TERRORISM: ELEMENTS OF A GRAND STRATEGY
115, 136 (Audrey Kurth Cronin & James M. Ludes eds., 2004).
195. See supra notes 30-39 and accompanying text.
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courts to enter the fray even in the wake of widespread revelations of
intelligence abuses. Courts handed down the bulk of case law addressing CIA
authority in the late 1970s, a time in which the pendulum had swung far in the
direction of outrage and disgust with the intelligence community as a whole.
96
Yet courts declined the opportunity to severely castigate the CIA-let alone
clarify the Agency's mandate-even in the face of painstakingly documented
illegal and questionable activity by the Agency. In Birnbaum, the Second
Circuit upheld the district court's award of $1,000 in compensatory damages to
each plaintiff whose mail the CIA had unlawfully read but stated that it could
not "share entirely the [m]oral concern of the District Court over these
activities, for the security of the nation was said to be involved. We assume that
the CIA officials meant well by their country."'
197
There is little reason to believe that courts, after refusing to clarify the CIA
mandate in a time of widespread opprobrium of intelligence activities, would
now take up the task of charting the limits of CIA authority. If anything,
judicial deference to the executive branch on this subject would likely be higher
now than in the atmosphere of the 1970s given the relatively stronger support
for the Agency and its mission in the war on terrorism.
Even assuming judicial will to address the CIA mandate, the nature of
judicial action provides substantial impediments to doing so. Constitutional and
prudential roadblocks to judicial relief are exacerbated by the absence of
widely available public information of intelligence abuses such as that
generated by the investigatory commissions of the 1970s.198 Oftentimes the
secret nature of intelligence collection can prevent abuses from becoming
known to potential plaintiffs who might then be able to challenge certain
intelligence collection techniques or activities in court. 199 Furthermore, cases
would likely come in a time of crisis, and a decision may strike the wrong
balance or be limited to specific factual circumstances.
20 0
A reasoned public and legislative discussion could take a broader view,
196. See supra Section II.C. Judge Wilkey of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
described the political atmosphere at the time: "media attention riveted on alleged CIA lawlessness with
an intensity matched in recent times only by coverage of the Watergate scandals." In re Halkin, 598 F.2d
176, 200 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (dictum) (Wilkey, J., dissenting).
197. Bimbaum v. United States, 588 F.2d 319, 332 (2d Cir. 1978). The Court continued: "Even
testimony before the Senate Committee by a principal CIA official, stating that he knew that the mail
opening was illegal but thought it in the national interest ... gives us no cause for a homily." Id.
198. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
199. Judicial remediesare often impeded by the "difficulty of identifying the source of a claimed
abuse" and "the ambiguity of the injury suffered by the target, contrasted with the importance of the
interest (the security of the nation itself) asserted in defense of the challenged conduct, increases a
complainant's burdens." DONNER, supra note 112, at xii. Moreover, judicial relief "is powerless to
reduce the intimidating impact of surveillance programs" because "judicial remedies are typically
limited to individuals and, in any event, delayed until long after the conduct complained of." Id.
200. See supra Section IV.A.2. See also Hitz, supra note 62, at 774 (arguing legislative
clarification "is preferable to being forced to change as a consequence of judicial action, which will
understandably focus more on the rights of Americans than the difficulty of the anti-terrorist mission.").
Yale Law & Policy Review
would not be limited by specific sets of facts, and could better balance the
competing priorities involved in the CIA mandate (e.g., cooperation between
government agencies, the rights of criminal defendants, protection of civil
liberties, etc.). If anything, a clearer charter would, at least to some degree,
better facilitate the ability of the courts to serve as a check on intelligence
activities. Finally, reliance on courts to define the CIA mandate maintains the
ambiguity of the status quo in the interim and therefore prevents greater
efficiency in interagency cooperation in the fight against terrorism.
2. Congressional Oversight
The 9/11 Commission minced no words in expressing its opinion: "So long
as oversight is governed by current congressional rules and resolutions, we
believe the American people will not get the security they want and need. '2 °1
The 9/11 Commission was highly critical of the current congressional oversight
structure and made reform of that structure a central recommendation in its
report. 20 2 Yet that recommendation fell upon deaf ears, and the Intelligence
Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 did not overhaul the structure of
congressional oversight of the intelligence community. Though the notable
absence of oversight reform has been roundly criticized,20 3 the 9/11
Commission recommendations appear to have little traction in the current
Congress.
204
Dramatic improvement of the congressional oversight structure, though
clearly in order, would still be incomplete without statutory clarification of the
CIA mandate because both are necessary to prevent abuses effectively. Even
the most vigilant and well-intentioned oversight cannot effectively navigate the
rocky shoals of ambiguity of mandate. At the same time, a lack of meaningful
oversight of CIA activity could negate many benefits of even the most
crystalline limits of CIA authority. In sum, strong oversight is not a
201. 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 15, at 419.
202. See id. at 419-21. The 9/11 Commission called the current oversight structure "dysfunctional"
and recommended, among other suggestions, that the intelligence committees be granted appropriations
powers or be merged into a joint House-Senate committee. Id.
203. See, e.g., Editorial, Intelligence and Civil Rights, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 11, 2004, at A 18 ("[T]he
public cannot expect much protection from a Congress that passed intelligence reform but glaringly
failed to overhaul its own morass of oversight committees."); Editorial, Energizer Bunnies, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 31, 2004, at A26 (quoting Senator John McCain as saying congressional leaders resisted oversight
reform because "[t]he old bulls are more interested in protecting turf than protecting national security");
Philip Shenon & Eric Lipton, 9/11 Panel Members to Lobby for a Restructured Congress, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 21, 2004, at A20 ("There is no shortage of voices calling for powerful and unified Congressional
oversight."). The members of the 9/11 Commission have formed a lobbying group to continue to press
for oversight reform. Id.
204. See Shenon & Lipton, supra note 203, at A20 (citing opposition to the 9/11 Commission's
proposals for oversight reform by House Speaker J. Dennis Hastert and quoting Representative Jane




replacement for statutory clarification (nor vice versa) and would also not
capture all of the benefits of formal amendment of the CIA mandate, such as
improved cooperation with law enforcement.
3. Presidential Directives and Internal Checks
Reliance on presidential directives to shed light on the CIA mandate and
the "handoff' between law enforcement and intelligence represents a
continuation of the status quo. Executive Order 12,333, though not a paragon of
clarity, provides important directional guidance to the intelligence
community.20 5 Yet its utility is limited by the simple and fundamental fact that
an executive order lacks the power to alter the CIA's statutory mandate.
20 6
Indeed, Executive Order 12,333 directly states it is constrained by the National
Security Act of 1947 and other laws and was promulgated for purposes of
guidance. 207 Such guidance as found in an executive order could not legally
authorize any activity deemed to fall outside the bounds of the prohibitions in
the National Security Act. Thus, the utility of an executive order is severely
diminished because it still operates within-but cannot resolve-the unclear
statutory limits on CIA authority.208 Seen in this light, guidance in the face of
categorical, but ill-defined, statutory prohibitions is a distant "second best" to
clarifying the prohibitions themselves.
The guidance provided by executive orders as to CIA authority is also less
predictable and meaningful because executive orders can be rescinded by the
President at anytime. Though a statute could also be rescinded or amended, it
would require more consensus and deliberation than merely the changed
opinion of the President and would likely prompt greater public scrutiny and
debate. More to the point, the political pressure to misuse the Agency during
205. The analysis of this Section often refers to Executive Order 12,333 but would apply with equal
force to any unilateral presidential directive.
206. Executive Order 12,333 is not based on specific statutory or delegated legislative authority.
Moreover, an executive order could not trump a statute. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer,
343 U.S. 579, 585-89 (1952); see also Marks v. CIA, 590 F.2d 997, 1003 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (discussing
Executive Order 12,036, the predecessor to Executive Order 12,333, and clearly stating, "[o]f course, an
executive order cannot supersede a statute"); Derek Jinks & David Sloss, Is the President Bound by the
Geneva Conventions?, 90 CORNELL L. REv. 97, 144-45 (2004) ("[A] unilateral executive order can
never supersede a prior inconsistent statute because a unilateral executive order that conflicts with a
valid federal statute is per se invalid.").
207. Exec. Order No. 12,333, supra note 12, at 59,954. The relevant text reads in full: "This Order
is intended to control and provide direction and guidance to the Intelligence Community. Nothing
contained herein or in any procedures promulgated hereunder is intended to confer any substantive or
procedural right or privilege on any person or organization." Id.
208. See DYcUS ET AL., supra note 38, at 706 (posing the question: "How may the CIA 'conduct
counterintelligence activities within the United States in coordination with the FBI' [under Executive
Order 12,333] without performing any 'internal security functions?'). Critics of Executive Order
12,333 suggest it is "illegal" to the extent it contains provisions inconsistent with the CIA's statutory
mandate. See, e.g., Sherri J. Conrad, Note, Executive Order 12,333: "Unleashing" the CIA Violates the
Leash Law, 70 CORNELL L. REv. 968, 976, 989 (1985) ("Executive Order 12,333 illegally defines the
contours of intelligence community activity.").
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the Cold War came primarily from the highest levels of the executive branch,
thus providing a strong argument against leaving guidance and clarification of
the CIA's mandate to the president's sole discretion. 20 9 If history serves as any
guide, dirty marching orders are more likely to come from the President than
Congress given the CIA's institutional location within the executive branch and
the Agency's relationship with the President. Statutory amendment cannot
guarantee the law will not be disregarded, but it would provide a better check
than an executive order and would supply clearer guideposts for congressional
oversight and executive branch officials such as inspectors general.210
A statute would also be more effective than an executive order because it
would better entrench the guidance and clarified boundaries of authority within
everyday CIA activity. Statutory amendment would most clearly and forcefully
state the limits of CIA authority, thereby assisting the decisions of CIA officials
and lawyers. This clear statement of norms of behavior (in this case
clarification of prohibited activity) could also further the internalization of
these norms among CIA officials.211
For reasons similar to those discussed above, reliance on advisory boards,
inspectors general, and other internal checks within the executive branch is less
effective than statutory clarification would be in preventing abuse. 21 2 If
anything, a clearer CIA charter would bolster the abilities of oversight officials
by providing better guideposts to monitor CIA activity. In any case, it must be
recalled that these officials and boards can, at best, assist in issues of oversight.
Unlike statutory clarification, checks internal to the executive branch are
incapable of alleviating the coordination challenges between intelligence and
law enforcement agencies.
4. Potential Disadvantages
Legislative reconsideration of the CIA mandate is not without risk. There
may be benefits to retaining a certain level of ambiguity (more often cast as
"flexibility" by supporters of this argument) in the language of the National
209. See supra notes 68-69 and accompanying text. See also Lawrence P. Gottesman, Note, The
Intelligence Identities Protection Act of 1982: An Assessment of the Constitutionality of Section 601(c),
49 BROOK. L. REv. 479, 501 n. 117 (arguing that the "substantive and procedural limitations" on CIA
activity do not "constitute a significant check on illegal intelligence activities," partly because "the
concept of illegality is inherently fluid since Executive Orders may be revoked as expediency requires").
210. See supra Section IV.C.2.
211. For background on the process and importance of norm internalization, see generally Harold
Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law?, 106 YALE L.J. 2599 (1997) (book review);
Harold Hongju Koh, The 1998 Frankel Lecture: Bringing International Law Home, 35 HOUS. L. REv.
623 (1998).
212. For additional background on such internal checks, see, for example, IRTPA § 1071 (to be
codified at 50 U.S.C. § 403q) (defining the responsibilities and role of the Inspector General of the
CIA); and IRTPA § 1061 (establishing a Privacy and Civil Liberties Ove:sight Board within the




Security Act. According to the IC21 Commission: "There is no need to further
clarify the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, or the subsequent
Executive Orders" because "[t]here is a flexibility in these laws that permits a
reasonable, but well-bounded, range of interpretation that will allow for
improved cooperation and coordination between law enforcement and
intelligence without blurring important demarcations between the missions and
authorities of the two communities. '213 Yet this IC21 recommendation predated
September 11 by five years, and the fight against terrorism (as well as other
post-Cold War national security priorities) is making such "important
demarcations" increasingly difficult to discern.2 14 Furthermore, the IC21
Commission conceded that one of the outcomes of the intelligence scandals of
the 1970s was a sometimes overly conservative approach toward cooperation
between the law enforcement and intelligence communities. 215 Additionally,
this "range of interpretation" in the CIA mandate led to interpretations of
convenience in the Cold War and leaves us more vulnerable to abuse.
2 16
Clarification of the CIA mandate could be "overlawyered" and therefore
reduce the effectiveness of cooperation between intelligence and law
enforcement. A similar result occurred in the aftermath of two banking scandals
in the 1980s involving Bank of Credit and Commerce International (BCCI) and
Banca Nazionale del Lavoro (BNL). The BCCI and BNL scandals resulted
largely from problems in the sharing and management of information between
the CIA and law enforcement officials.217 In the early 1990s, a high-level
interagency task force produced recommendations to improve communication
between intelligence and law enforcement and created several interagency
working groups, including the Joint Task Force on Intelligence and Law
Enforcement (JICLE), to further develop those recommendations. JICLE
produced memoranda of understanding in the wake of the banking scandals but,
according to Jeffrey Smith, General Counsel of the CIA at the time, the JICLE
process had "overlawyered it" and "the product was going to 'gum up the
works' and make cooperation [between intelligence and law enforcement] more
difficult."218 Statutory revision could similarly open the door to overregulation
213. IC21 STAFF STUDY, supra note 150, at 272, 288. It should be noted, however, that the next
paragraph of the IC21 report undercuts this conclusion to some extent by citing a need for the
establishment of "procedures by which the [intelligence and law enforcement] communities can
interface effectively." Id. at 273.
214. See supra Part III.
215. IC21 STAFF STUDY, supra note 150, at 272; see also supra note 190 and accompanying text.
216. See supra Section II.C.
217. For background on the BCCI and BNL scandals, see IC21 STAFF STUDY supra note 150, at
277-78.
218. Telephone Interview with Jeffrey H. Smith, supra note 24. The "overlawyering" component of
JICLE eventually became a verb and was referred to as "JICLEd to death." Telephone Interview with
Robert 0. Davis, supra note 157. Ultimately, the regulations produced in the JICLE process were
replaced in practice by joint FBI-CIA teams that would focus on specific targets, but the creation of "the
wall" in the mid-1990s ended these activities (until the post-September 11 legislative changes).
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or hamper cooperation between law enforcement and intelligence if not done
correctly.
Overall, the advantages of clarifying the CIA mandate outweigh the
reduced "flexibility" and the risks of excessive or imperfect regulation. The
best approach is to be cognizant of, but undeterred by, the dangers of statutory
amendment. Revision of the CIA mandate in the context of the ongoing
national dialogue with respect to the fight against terrorism and reform of the
intelligence community offers the best opportunity for a thoughtful and
reasoned approach to the issues. The alternatives are much less palatable.
Continuation of the ambiguity of mandate risks abuse and prevents efficiencies.
At the same time, reactive or haphazard adjustment of CIA authorities risks
undercutting civil liberties and due process with insufficient forethought and
public debate. A case in point was a May 2003 attempt by the Bush
Administration and select legislators to give the CIA and the Pentagon the
authority to issue administrative subpoenas (known as "national security
letters") to obtain personal and financial records of people within the United
States.21 9 The proposal was slipped into a broader intelligence authorization bill
(with little discussion) but was eventually defeated.220 Such alterations to the
powers of the CIA and Pentagon can impact due process and civil liberties and
should therefore be openly debated on their merits.
D. Proposed Statutory Revision
This Note's primary purpose is to place reexamination of the limits of CIA
authority on the national agenda as part of ongoing policy decisions regarding
intelligence reform and cooperation between intelligence and law enforcement
agencies. To that end, this Note proposes draft statutory amendments intended
to clarify and improve cooperation between intelligence and law enforcement
and provide additional safeguards for the protection of civil liberties.22'
Five key principles should be considered when clarifying the CIA charter.
First, statutory clarification should advance and balance both goals described in
Telephone Interview with Jeffrey H. Smith, supra note 24.
219. A national security letter requires no court approval and can be used to request personal
information and specified records (e.g., records from financial institutions, information from consumer
reporting agencies, etc.) in national security investigations. For criticism of the use of national security
letters, see, e.g., JAMES BOVARD, TERRORISM AND TYRANNY 146 (2003) (arguing that national security
letters "turn the Fourth Amendment on its head by creating a presumption that the government is entitled
to personal or confidential information unless the citizen or business can prove to a federal judge that the
National Security Letter should not be enforced against them," which is especially disturbing because
"few Americans can afford the cost of litigating against the Justice Department to preserve their
privacy").
220. For background on the national security letter proposal see Eric Lichtblau & James Risen,
Broad Domestic Role Asked for C.I.A. and the Pentagon, N.Y. TIMES, May 2, 2003, at A2 1. See also
Robert Block & Gary Fields, Is Military Creeping Into Domestic Spying and Enforcement?, WALL ST.
J., March 9, 2004, at BI.
221. These draft statutory amendments are meant to serve as a starting point for discussion.
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this Note: clarifying boundaries to reduce potential abuse and improving
efficiency in countering transnational threats. Second, statutory revision should
balance clarity with flexibility. Overly rigid statutory language could backfire
and reduce the effectiveness of the CIA by unduly limiting CIA activities or
increasing transactions costs for CIA activities that were not originally of
concern (e.g., by creating a bulky approval process for a method of collection
that poses few risks of running afoul of civil liberties). Third, any legislation
should respect inherent executive authorities in the fields of foreign affairs and
222
national security. Fourth, although the current national security environment
is the driving force for statutory clarification, revision should not, to the extent
possible, focus solely on current national security threats. There will be
different types of national security threats in the future, so statutory revision
should seek to resolve the problems at hand while minimizing the degree to
which we lock ourselves into procedures that only work against current threats
(at the expense of creating a slow response to future threats). Fifth, statutory
clarification should be designed as a "shield" and not just a "sword." Statutory
clarification should strengthen the shield effect and improve the CIA's ability
to resist pressure to reinterpret its mandate should there be a repeat of the
improper high-level political pressure placed on the Agency during the Cold
War.
223
Much of the groundwork for statutory revision of the CIA mandate was laid
in the detailed commission reports released in the 1970s and the resultant
executive orders. The best approach is to selectively include, combine, and
modify the relevant language of the failed Charter Legislation, the
recommendations made by previous commissions that studied the CIA and
intelligence reform, and topical executive orders. In that vein, this Note
suggests five areas of statutory change that would clarify the limits of the CIA
mandate better than the current language as codified in 50 U.S.C. § 403-
2244a(d).
First, the permissible domestic activities of the CIA should be directly
addressed through creation of a new section of the U.S. Code:
50 U.S.C. § 403-9. Central Intelligence Agency activity within the United
States
225
222. See Richard, supra note 23, at 8-9.
223. See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
224. Some of the statutory proposals suggested by this Note are directed at all agencies within the
intelligence community rather than specifically focused on the CIA so as to provide a more
comprehensive approach. In general, the language of the proposed amendments is intended to be
consistent with the language used elsewhere in the U.S. Code and, where applicable, Executive Order
12,333.
225. This proposed section combines and modifies provisions in Executive Order 12,333 and the
failed Charter Legislation in an effort to delineate the means and limits of permissible domestic activity
by the CIA. See Exec. Order 12,333 §§ 1.8 and 2.4; National Intelligence Reorganization and Reform
Act of 1978, S. 2525, 95th Cong. § 413(h)(1)-(2) (1978). This proposed section seeks to serve three
main functions: (1) to ensure all domestic CIA intelligence activity is lawful and coordinated with the
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(a) Subject to subsections (b) and (c) of this section, the Central Intelligence
Agency may:
(1) Collect foreign intelligence or counterintelligence within the United
States, as permitted by law, if such intelligence is integrally related to its
foreign intelligence or counterintelligence activities outside the United
States;
(2) Protect the security of its installations, activities, information, property,
and employees by appropriate means, including such investigations of
applicants, employees, contractors, and other persons with similar
associations with the Agency as are necessary;
(3) Carry out or contract for research, development and procurement of
technical systems and devices relating to authorized functions; and
(4) Conduct such administrative and technical support activities within and
outside the United States as are necessary to perform the functions of the
Agency, including procurement and essential cover and proprietary
arrangements.
(b) All Agency activities involving the collection of foreign intelligence or
counterintelligence within the United States and all Agency counterintelligence and
counterterrorism activities within the United States shall be conducted in
coordination with the Federal Bureau of Investigation and in accordance with
procedures agreed upon by the Attorney General and the Director of National
Intelligence. Such procedures shall protect constitutional and other legal rights and
limit the use of information collected in the activities described in this paragraph to
lawful governmental purposes.
(c) The Agency shall use the least intrusive collection techniques feasible when
collecting information within the United States.
(d) The Director of National Intelligence and the Attorney General shall
conduct a review, at least annually, of all Agency activities within the United States
for the purpose of ensuring that such activities do not violate any right protected by
the Constitution or laws of the United States, determining the necessity for
continuing such activities, and making such recommendations in this regard as they
deem appropriate to the President, the National Security Council, and the
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives and
the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate.
(e) Definition. For the purposes of this section, the term "United States" has the
meaning given such term in 50 U.S.C. § 18010).
Second, the authority of the intelligence community to collect information
related to United States persons should be addressed through creation of a new
section of the U.S. Code, with the proposed text reading:
50 U.S.C.22 § 403-5(f). Authority to collect information concerning United
States persons.
FBI; (2) to provide a means for regular review of CIA domestic activity; and (3) to provide clearer
guidance as to the CIA's ability to protect its information and investigate persons associated with the
agency (a point which was litigated in Weissman and Marks, supra note 33). The phrase "as permitted
by law" in paragraph (1) is designed to preserve legal constraints on intelligence collection within the
United States and to prevent any portion of that paragraph from interfering with the domestic
intelligence collection regime established by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act.
226. This proposed section codifies the provisions of § 2.3 of Executive Order 12,333 with only
slight modification (such as adding the caveat "as permitted by law" to the domestic authorities of
agencies other than the FBI in paragraph (a)(2), and requiring that procedures established in subsection
(a) also be approved by the Director of National Intelligence). This proposed language also adds the
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(a) Agencies within the Intelligence Community are authorized to collect,
retain, and/or disseminate information concerning United States persons only in
accordance with procedures established by the head of the agency concerned and
approved by the Director of National Intelligence and the Attorney General. Those
procedures shall permit collection, retention and dissemination of the following
types of information:
(1) Information that is publicly available or collected with the consent of
the person concerned;
(2) Information constituting foreign intelligence or counterintelligence,
including such information concerning corporations or other commercial
organizations. Collection within the United States of foreign intelligence
not otherwise obtainable shall be undertaken by the FBI or, when
significant foreign intelligence is sought, by other authorized agencies of
the Intelligence Community, as permitted by law, provided that no foreign
intelligence collection by such agencies may be undertaken for the purpose
of acquiring information concerning the domestic activities of United
States persons;
(3) Information obtained in the course of a lawful foreign intelligence,
counterintelligence, international narcotics or international terrorism
investigation;
(4) Information needed to protect the safety of any persons or
organizations, including those who are targets, victims or hostages of
international terrorist organizations;
(5) Information needed to protect foreign intelligence or
counterintelligence sources or methods from unauthorized disclosure.
Collection within the United States shall be undertaken by the FBI except
that other agencies of the Intelligence Community may also collect such
information concerning present or former employees, present or former
intelligence agency contractors or their present or former employees, or
applicants for any such employment or contracting;
(6) Information concerning persons who are reasonably believed to be
potential sources or contacts for the purpose of determining their suitability
or credibility;
(7) Information arising out of a lawful personnel, physical or
communications security investigation;
(8) Information acquired by overhead reconnaissance not directed at
specific United States persons;
(9) Incidentally obtained information that may indicate involvement in
activities that may violate federal, state, local or foreign laws; and
(10) Information necessary for administrative purposes.
(b) Agencies within the Intelligence Community shall use the least intrusive
collection techniques feasible when directed at United States persons.
(c) Nothing in this section shall be construed to modify, repeal, supersede, or
otherwise affect the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. §
1801 et seq.].
(d) Agencies within the Intelligence Community may disseminate information,
express statement that nothing in this section would invade or alter the domestic FISA regime. The
purpose of this section is to clearly state the bounds of permissible information collection regarding
United States persons in order to: (1) provide clear statutory operating guidelines as to the treatment of
United States persons both domestically and abroad; and (2) bolster and otherwise prevent loopholes in
the proposed section on the domestic powers of the CIA.
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other than information derived from signals intelligence, to each appropriate agency
within the Intelligence Community for purposes of allowing the recipient agency to
determine whether the information is relevant to its responsibilities and can be
retained by it.
(e) Definitions. For the purposes of this section:
(1) The term "United States" carries the same meaning as defined in 50
U.S.C. § 1801(j).
(2) The term "United States person" carries the same meaning as defined in
50 U.S.C. § 403-5a(c)(2).
Third, coordination between intelligence and law enforcement agencies
should be clarified by amending and expanding 50 U.S.C. § 403-5a(a) to read
as follows:
50 U.S.C. § 403-5a. Assistance to United States law enforcement agencies
227
(a) Authority to provide assistance
(1) Subject to subsection (b), elements of the Intelligence Community
are authorized to:
(A) Upon the request of a United States law enforcement agency,
collect information outside the United States about individuals who
are not United States persons. Such elements may collect such
information notwithstanding that the law enforcement agency intends
to use the information collected for purposes of a law enforcement
investigation or counterintelligence investigation;
(B) Cooperate with appropriate law enforcement agencies for the
purpose of protecting the employees, information, property and
facilities of any agency within the Intelligence Community;
(C) Unless otherwise precluded by law, participate in law enforcement
activities to investigate or prevent clandestine intelligence activities by
foreign powers or their agents, or international terrorist or narcotics
activities;
(D) Provide specialized equipment, technical knowledge, or assistance
of expert personnel for use by any department or agency, or, when
lives are endangered, to support local law enforcement agencies.
Provision of assistance by expert personnel shall be approved in each
case by the General Counsel of the providing agency; and
(E) Render any other assistance and cooperation to law enforcement
authorities not precluded by applicable law.
Fourth, the potential negative impacts from close cooperation between
intelligence and law enforcement should be formally assessed and minimized to
the extent possible. A new subsection of the U.S. Code should be created to
read as follows:
50 U.S.C. § 403-5b(d). 229 As soon as possible, but in no event later than 180
227. This proposed subsection builds on 50 U.S.C. § 403-5a(a) by adding relevant provisions from
Executive Order 12,333 with only slight modification (addition of"or their agents" in subparagraph (C)
to extend the reach of that provision). See Exec. Order No. 12,333 § 2.6. The goal of this expanded
subsection is to statutorily allow for closer cooperation between intelligence and law enforcement.
228. Subsection (b) is only relevant to intelligence agencies within the military and would be
unchanged by this proposed amendment. See 50 U.S.C. § 403-5a(b) (West Supp. 2004).
229. This proposed subsection is modeled after other subsections in 50 U.S.C. § 403-5b that
address, inter alia, the sharing of foreign intelligence uncovered in criminal investigations with the DNI.
Vol. 23:529, 2005
The CIA Mandate
days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence
and the Attorney General shall jointly issue guidelines and procedures to protect the
security and sources and methods of foreign intelligence or counterintelligence
disclosed by elements of the Intelligence Community and used by the Attorney
General, or any other department or agency of the Federal Government with law
enforcement responsibilities, in the course of a criminal investigation or judicial
proceeding.
Additionally, the protection of intelligence should be added to the stated
attributes of and required guidelines for the Information Sharing
Environment.23 ° Specifically, 6 U.S.C. § 485(b)(2)(H), which states the
attributes of the ISE, should be amended to add the following italicized
language and to read in relevant part: "incorporates protections for individuals'
privacy and civil liberties and the security and sources and methods of
intelligence." The protection of intelligence should also be added to
requirements on the production of guidelines by the President for the ISE. A
new paragraph, 6 U.S.C. § 485(d)(4), should be created, the text of which
would read: "issue guidelines that protect the security and sources and methods
of intelligence in the development and use of the ISE."
Fifth, 50 U.S.C. § 403-4a(d)(l) should be amended to read: "The Agency
shall have no police or subpoena powers, and no law enforcement or internal
security functions except as otherwise permitted by law." 231 This text would
recognize the Agency's authority to cooperate with law enforcement agencies
and its limited domestic functions.
The statutory revisions proposed in this Note would strengthen intelligence
reform while avoiding the problems and issues that led to the downfall of the
Charter Legislation, as they are limited in focus and do not include contentious
This proposal is meant to focus deliberate and sustained attention on the impacts on due process and the
protection of intelligence caused by cooperation between law enforcement and intelligence agencies.
The issuance of guidelines and procedures would centralize, build upon, and be superior to, the ad hoc
efforts to address the issue to date. Moreover, requiring production of reports and guidelines is a
standard modus operandi in treating such subjects in the field of intelligence law. See, e.g., IRTPA, §§
1011, 1016, 1018. Finally, increased attention and guidelines as to this issue may provide the basis for
future statutory additions (if deemed desirable) that would address issues such as a defendant's right of
discovery and a prosecutor's duty to search in the context of intelligence community files. See supra
Section IV.A.2. In this vein, former Deputy Attorney General Philip Heymann argues the federal
government should "propose a statute in an effort to use the weight of legislation to settle open
questions, as the CIPA statute did" because "[e]ven when the issue involves constitutional requirements
of disclosure, as in Brady, the Supreme Court is likely to give great deference to the views of the
executive and legislative branches on an issue that has such significant national security dimensions."
Heymann, supra note 121, at 12.
230. The ISE as codified does not explicitly address protection of intelligence either as a goal or as
a subject of guidelines that must be produced by the President in operationalizing the ISE. See 6 IRTPA
§ 1016 (to be codified at 6 U.S.C. § 485).
23 1. This construction of the prohibitions of CIA activity makes an important grammatical change
to the language of the National Security Act. As amended, the prohibitions against police and subpoena
powers would remain categorical and only the prohibitions of law enforcement and internal security
functions would be modified by the caveat "except as otherwise permitted by law." The prohibitions of
police and subpoena powers need not be changed to capture the advantages of statutory clarification
described in this Note; there are no strong policy arguments to amend them.
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issues such as covert action.232 Proponents of statutory clarification would be
wise to stress the benefits of improving cooperation between law enforcement
and intelligence in addition to the harms (the prospect of lost criminal
convictions or abuse of civil liberties) inherent in the status quo. Proponents
should also emphasize the protective nature of a clearer mandate, such as in
shielding the Agency and its employees from improper directives; this




The march of intelligence reform should not halt prematurely. Although
much progress has been made, much remains to be done. It would be
unfortunate for the Executive and Congress to rest on their laurels after the
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act rather than carry through
other needed reforms such as clarification of the CIA charter. The limits of CIA
authority are simply too important to be left to historical accident or ambiguity,
and there is too much at stake to confront revision of the CIA mandate in a
reactive or haphazard manner. The superior approach is to consider these issues
in an open and deliberate manner and to do so sooner rather than later. Any
risks inherent in inspection and a frank reevaluation of the CIA mandate are
clearly outweighed by the risks of inaction, be they intelligence abuses,
disclosed sources and methods, or foregone criminal convictions. Therefore,
statutory revision of the CIA charter based on a forthright realization of the
new national security environment is the best course ahead to prevent abuse
and maximize the effectiveness of our national security resources.
232. See supra notes 80-83 and accompanying text.
233. See supra notes 71-73 and accompanying text.
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